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Comment
It's My Body, It's My Choice:
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
Tamara F. Kushnir*
The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mary-Dorothy Line was nineteen weeks pregnant when she found out
that there was no hope for her pregnancy; her fetus was growing with a
skull filled with fluid instead of a brain. 2 Claudia Crown Ades learned
at the twenty-sixth gestational week that her fetus had extensive damage
to the brain, heart, and internal organs. 3 Vikki Stella discovered in her
thirty-second week of pregnancy that her fetus had nine major
anomalies including a fluid-filled skull.4 All three of these women were
advised by their physicians that an intact dilation and evacuation
procedure was the best option to terminate their pregnancies safely
without compromising their future attempts to bear children. 5 Congress
had not yet enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
("PBABA"), which would have prevented these women from getting

* J.D. expected May 2005. Thank you to the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
editorial staff for their hard work and support throughout the writing process. Thank you also to
Dr. Allison Cowett and Dr. Scott Moses for their medical insights; I could not have written this
article without them. Lastly, I would like to thank my family who taught me the essential value
of caring for the well-being of others.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
2. See Gloria Feldt, Late-term Abortions Should Not Be Banned (explaining why abortion
bans are harmful to women), in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 86, 86 (Lynette Knapp ed.,

2001).
3. Id.
4. Id. The fluid-filled skull had no brain tissue at all. Id.
5. Id. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 bans the intact dilation and extraction
procedure. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the dilation and extraction procedure, sometimes
referred to as intact dilation and evacuation).
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the medical attention that their doctors believed was necessary. 6 Since
having the procedure, all three women are healthy,7 and Mary-Dorothy
and Vikki both have given birth to healthy children.

On November 5, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the
PBABA. 8 Signing the bill ended an eight-year struggle by proponents
of the bill that Congress twice passed but President William Clinton
twice vetoed. 9 The PBABA prohibits a particular late term abortion
procedure that some consider cruel or gruesome. 10 Others, however,

argue that the law constitutes the first step in an attempt to overrule the
fundamental right to abortion guaranteed in Roe v. Wade. 11 Thus, as
soon as both houses of Congress passed the bill, a debate began
regarding whether the bill's limitation on the right to have an abortion

was constitutional.

12

6. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531) (defining "partial-birth" abortion essentially as the intact dilation
and evacuation procedure); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing abortion techniques used after
the first trimester).
7. See Feldt, supra note 2, at 86 (explaining that the two women later were able to give birth
to healthy children because they had access to the abortion procedure banned by the PBABA).
8.

Robin Toner, For G.O.P., It's a Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at Al (reporting on

the Act's enactment and noting that the PBABA represents a "political triumph for the antiabortion movement"), availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File; see PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
9. See infra Part 1II.A (discussing the legislative history of acts to ban partial birth abortion).
10. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (describing the prohibited procedure as "gruesome
and inhumane"); see Amicus Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et al. at 14,
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (stating that the protection of other
"equally gruesome" procedures does not necessitate protecting this type of abortion procedure),
availableat 2000 WL 223648; STOPP Int'l, PP To Seek FederalInjunction Against PartialBirth
Abortion Ban, THE RYAN REPORT, June 2003 (opposing Planned Parenthood's support of a
"gruesome" and "hideous" abortion procedure), available at http://www.all.org/stopp/rrD306.htm
(last visited June 15, 2004); see also Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7, Stenberg (No. 99-830) (noting that the Family Research Council
"championed [the] view" that all abortion procedures are "gruesome"), available at 2000 WL
34005434.
11. See Raju Chebium, Supreme Court Throws Out Nebraska Law Banning Controversial
Abortion Procedure,CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/28/scotus.partialbirth.02/
index.html (June 28, 2000) (quoting President Clinton after the Stenberg decision as saying it was
the "only decision you could reach consistent with Roe v. Wade"). Abortion is defined as "the
removal of an embryo or fetus from the uterus in order to end a pregnancy." RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (2d ed. 1987). A late term abortion is performed
after the first trimester, at approximately twelve to fourteen gestational weeks. See WORLD
HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS
38-39 (2003) (outlining methods of abortion by length of pregnancy divided into twelve-week
periods),
available at http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/safeabortion/
SafeAbortion.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
12. Bob Egelko, Ban on Abortion Method Tested, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2003, at A3
(discussing lawsuits planned by those opposed to the PBABA), available at 2003 WL 3767084;
Debra Rosenberg, A Firefight over Abortion; In a Dramatic Move, Congress Votes To Ban
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This Comment will argue that the PBABA is unconstitutional and
that any further attempt to legislate abortion, in order to be

constitutional, must satisfy Justice O'Connor's requirements from
Stenberg v. Carhart,13 the most recent Supreme Court decision on this
late term abortion procedure. 14 First, Part II of this Comment will
explain the history of the right to abortion and the different abortion
procedures at issue in the PBABA. 15 Next, Part III will examine the
6
legislative history and statutory language of the PBABA.1 Part IV of

this Comment will demonstrate that the PBABA is unconstitutional
because it fails to restrict only the dilation and extraction procedure and
does not contain an adequate health exception as Justice O'Connor
required in Stenberg. 17 Finally, Part V of this Comment will propose
possible changes to the PBABA that would fit the law within the
constitutional framework of the18 Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy as it pertains to abortion.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of abortion law in the United States has followed an often
complex and tumultuous path. 19 Accordingly, this Part first explores
the major cases through which the right to privacy led to the right to
abortion. 20
This Part also explains the most common abortion
techniques to provide background on the medical ramifications of

'Partial Birth' Procedures,Setting the Stage for Judicial Showdown, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 2003,
at 44 (discussing the anticipated Planned Parenthood lawsuit contesting the constitutionality of
the new law and noting that the Planned Parenthood president commented, "We will be in court
before the ink is dry on the President's signature."), available at 2003 WL 8640209; Senate
Passes 'PartialBirth' Abortion Ban, CNN.cOM, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/
10/21.abortion.ap/index.html (Oct. 21, 2003) (predicting some of the legal issues proponents and
opponents of the bill would face once President Bush signed the PBABA into law).
13. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947-51 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the importance of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Stenberg v. Carhart).
15. See infra Part II (tracing the history of the right to abortion and explaining the different
abortion procedures).
16. See infra Part III (showing the evolution of acts to ban partial birth abortions in prior
congressional terms and in state law that lead to the current law).
17. See infra Part IV (examining the PBABA in detail).
18. See infra Part V (proposing changes to the PBABA that make the statute fit a
constitutional framework of acceptable prohibitions on abortion procedures).
19. See generally Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in ABORTION: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
1965-2000, at xi-xxxvi (Ian Shapiro ed., 2d ed. 2001) (examining the legal history of abortion
through years of legislation and litigation).
20. See infra Part II.A (outlining the evolution of the right to abortion as derived from the
right to privacy in other areas of life).

1120

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

limiting or restricting abortions. 2 1 Finally, this Part outlines the most
recent Supreme Court decision regarding the type of abortion that is
22
commonly known as a "partial birth" abortion.
A. The Right to Privacy and Abortion
The right to privacy "encompasses a freedom from intrusion by
others" into certain areas of private life. 2 3 This right, although
embodied by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, did not emerge until the twentieth century. 24 In the
twentieth century, the judicial system began to use the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to protect the right to privacy and associated
this right to privacy with activities and aspects of the human body,
namely marriage and reproduction,25 bodily integrity,26 and sexuality.2 7

21. See infra Part 11.B (discussing the abortion procedures generally used by the medical
community).
22. See infra Part II.B.3 (examining Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), and the
Court's reasoning in determining that Nebraska's partial birth abortion law was unconstitutional).
23. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 795 (5th ed. 1995).
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first discussed the right to privacy in detail in 1890 in their
seminal article "The Right to Privacy." See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (explaining that the law was expanding to include
private rights related to art, writings, and the right to be let alone). In their article, they explain
that in the same way the law of murder was extended to include attempted murder and the law of
personal property was extended to include the intangible, the law of newspaper intrusions should
expand to include the right to privacy. Id. at 193, 213 ("The principle which protects personal
writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and
the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal
appearance, sayings, act, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise."). Louis Brandeis later
became a Supreme Court Justice. See THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL Soc'Y, HISTORY OF
THE COURT, at http://www.supremecourthistory.org (last visited June 15, 2004) (providing
information on former Supreme Court Justices). Even before the Supreme Court declared a
formal right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the Supreme Court
mentioned the right to privacy in McCoy v. Union Elevated R..R., 247 U.S. 354, 355 (1918). In
McCoy, the Court was not persuaded that the construction of the elevated trains in Chicago
infringed upon the plaintiff's fundamental right to privacy regarding his property. McCoy, 247
U.S. at 355 (stating that the plaintiff was claiming rights "including the right of light, air, access,
privacy, view, etc." (emphasis added)).
24. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 796.
25. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that the law at issue "runs
afoul of the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]" because the law "involves
one of the basic civil rights of man," and that "marriage and procreation are fundamental").
26. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body
repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.").
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that a state may not prohibit
homosexual sodomy under the Due Process Clause).
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The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution prohibit the federal and state governments, respectively,
from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 2 8 During the first part of the twentieth century, the
"liberty" interest of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments included the
freedom to make choices that did not affect adversely legitimate state
interests.29 Since that time, the Supreme Court has labeled some
liberties "fundamental" because of their great importance. 30 When the

Court categorizes a liberty as fundamental, it applies strict scrutiny to
analyze whether any infringement on that liberty is constitutional; it
does not apply the deferential rational relationship test. 3 1 Under a strict
scrutiny analysis, the legislation must further a compelling state interest
32
and be narrowly tailored to fit that objective.
The right to privacy as it exists today emerged from a series of cases
classifying certain rights as fundamental, thus allowing the Court to
strictly scrutinize any regulation pertaining to them. 33 Beginning with
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
29. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 796; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a law requiring students to attend public rather than private
schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating a law that prohibited
teachers from teaching in any language other than English).
30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 695 (2001) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; see also infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (describing the
evolution of particular rights as fundamental).
31. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 695. The rational relationship
test is the minimal level of scrutiny a court will use to determine a constitutional infringement by
a governmental action. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 651 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES]. When using
the rational relationship test, courts employ a strong presumption in favor of the government; a
law will be upheld if there is any rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Id.
Legitimate purposes are often related to public safety, health, welfare, or morals, but they need
not be. Id. at 655. "Virtually any goal that is not forbidden by the Constitution will be deemed
sufficient to meet the rational basis test." Id. For the definition of strict scrutiny, see infra note
32 and accompanying text.
32. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (requiring a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose for the lowest level of scrutiny); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring a substantial relationship to an important government interest
for intermediate scrutiny); CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 529. The
Supreme Court has never defined specifically a "compelling" interest.
CHEMERINSKY,
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 31, at 767. Nonetheless, the government has the burden of
proof with respect to proving the "compelling" interest. Id. The law must be narrowly tailored,
meaning that there must be no less restrictive means of achieving the government's stated
interest. Id.
33. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 796 ("While these decisions might today be
grounded on the First Amendment, their existence is important to the growth of the right to
privacy.").
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Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the liberty interest to freely
make choices that do not adversely affect state interests. 34 The Court
held that a law prohibiting teaching students in German was an
unconstitutional restriction on education. 35 The fundamental right to
choose how one's children will be educated was reaffirmed in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.3 6 In Pierce, the Court held that a law requiring
students to go to public school and not permitting any students to attend
private school was unconstitutional.3 7 Further, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,

the Court held that a woman has a right to choose whether she wants to
give birth and, therefore, a law requiring the sterilization of persons who
committed at least two crimes of "moral turpitude" was
unconstitutional. 3 8 These "freedom of choice" cases laid the necessary
39
foundation for the modem right to privacy.
The modem right to privacy first appeared in Justice Harlan's 1961
dissent in Poe v. Ullman.40 Justice Harlan argued that the right to
34. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 ("We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is
arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state."). At
issue in Meyer was a law forbidding teaching students in any language except English. Id. at 396.
The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest protected the right to teach
and learn in languages other than English in schools. Id. at 400. The Court held that the law was
unconstitutional. Id. at 403.
35. Id.
36. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). In Pierce, two private religious
schools alleged that an Oregon law requiring students to attend only public schools was
unconstitutional. Id. at 530-33. The Court reasoned that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at
534-35.
37. Id. The Court noted that the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only.
Id.
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942). At issue in Skinner was a law
permitting the sterilization of "habitual criminals"-those criminals convicted of two or more
felonies involving "moral turpitude." Id. at 536. The Court held the law unconstitutional because
the law infringed on the fundamental liberty interest in procreation. Id. at 541.
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (identifying "zones of privacy"
derived from the penumbral nature of the protections specified in the Bill of Rights).
40. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 798 (stating that the "right to privacy was given its
first exposition by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman"); see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 536 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[T]he most substantial claim which these married persons press is their right to enjoy
the privacy of the marital relations .... I cannot agree that their enjoyment of this
privacy is not substantially impinged upon, when they are told that if they use

2004]

The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003

1123

privacy had a foundation in the Third and Fourth Amendments and that
the Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives at issue in
the case offended the spirit of those Amendments. 4 1 Justice Harlan
further commented that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures "protects the privacy of the home
against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character.- 4 2 One year
after Poe, the Court's majority used Justice Harlan's concept of the
43
right to privacy in its reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut.
1. Griswold Led the Way to the Modem Right to Privacy
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court clearly elucidated the
right to privacy and its origins. 44 At issue in Griswold was a

Connecticut statute prohibiting any person from using contraceptives or

aiding others in using them. 45 The appellants were doctors who had
instructed and given advice to married persons regarding the use of
contraceptives, indeed whether they do so or not, the only thing which stands between
them and being forced to render criminal account of their marital privacy is the whim
of the prosecutor.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). At issue in Poe was a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives and the dissemination of medical advice on the use of contraceptives. Id. at 498.
Ultimately, the majority opinion did not discuss the constitutional question because it held that
there was no justiciable question presented; the plaintiffs could not show that they were in
immediate danger of a direct injury because the statute had not been enforced against them. Id. at
504-05.
41. Poe, 367 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[T]his Connecticut statute does not invade the privacy of the home in the usual sense,
since the invasion involved here may, and doubtless usually would, be accomplished
without any physical intrusion whatever into the home. What the statute undertakes to
do, however, is to create a crime which is grossly offensive to this privacy.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan explained that the right to privacy in the home was
provided for explicitly in the Third and Fourth Amendments. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers without the consent of the home owner.
U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
amend. IV (emphasis added). Justice Harlan commented that "[w]hile these Amendments reach
only the Federal Government, this Court has held in the strongest terms, and today again
confirms, that the concept of 'privacy' embodied in the Fourth Amendment is part of the 'ordered
liberty' assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment." Poe, 376 U.S. at 549
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Poe, 376 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
44. See Debra L. Dippel, Someone To Watch over Me: Medical Decision Making for
Hopelessly Ill Incompetent Adult Patients, 24 AKRON L. REv. 639, 644 (1991) (explaining how
the Supreme Court deduced the right to privacy in Griswold and other cases using the protections
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
45. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
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The Court held that the
contraceptives. 4 6
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy. 47
Court noted that this statute was a direct invasion
and wife and the role
relationship between husband
48
play in the relationship.

statute was an
In doing so, the
into the intimate
that doctors must
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Justice Douglas' opinion, in which a majority of the Court concurred
in judgment, was a mere seven pages long and was followed by three
concurrences and two dissents. 49 Justice Douglas focused on deducing
the right to privacy from the scope of the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. 50 Justice Douglas explained that the First,5 1 Third, 52 Fourth,5 3
Fifth, 54 and Ninth 55 Amendments all have penumbras through which the
right to privacy is derived.5 6 For example, while the First Amendment
does not mention a freedom of association, the Court explicitly has
expanded the First Amendment's right to peaceably assemble to include
association. 57 At the end of the opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the
right to privacy predates the Bill of Rights and commented that
marriage is "intimate to the degree of being sacred." 58 Thus, the Court

46.

Id.

47. Id. at 485.
48. Id. at 482.
49. See id. at 480-86; id. at 486-99 (Golberg, J., concurring); id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J.
concurring); id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring); id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 52731 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 484.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging... the right of the people
peaceably to assemble."). See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (explaining that the First
Amendment protects forms of association that are not political but rather social, legal, or
economic).
52. Id. amend. III ("No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house.").
53. Id. amend. IV (affirming the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures").
54. Id. amend. V (providing a freedom from self incrimination).
55. Id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
56. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("[Tjhe specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."). Thus, the Court explained that each of the Amendments may be extended beyond
its literal meaning to protect a fight to privacy. Id. For example, the Third Amendment
prohibition against quartering soldiers "is another facet of that privacy." Id. "The Fourth and
Fifth Amendments were described.., as protection against all governmental invasions of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his life." Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
57. Id. at 483 (stating that the "freedom of association was a peripheral First Amendment
right" (citing NAACP v. State of Alabama, 351 U.S. 449, 462 (1958))).
58. Id. at 486 (stating that the right to privacy is older than the Bill of Rights).
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held that the contraception statute
was too broad and invaded areas
59
protected by the right to privacy.
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold focused on the language
and history of the Ninth Amendment. 60 The Ninth Amendment states
that those rights explicitly mentioned in the Constitution do not serve as
a complete list of all rights belonging to Americans. 6 1 While the Ninth
Amendment does not create new rights, it recognizes that not all rights
are enumerated specifically. 6 2 As such, Justice Goldberg explained that
some rights exist that are not listed explicitly in the Bill of Rights, but
which the Framers believed deserved protection through the Ninth
Amendment. 6 3 In other words, he contended that the rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights are not an exhaustive list, and that certain rights not
listed, such as the right to privacy, are fundamental. 64 Additionally,
Justice Goldberg argued that although legislative 'bodies must be
granted some deference to experiment with social laws,6 5that deference
does not include experimenting with fundamental rights.
59. Id. at 485-86.
60. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
62. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
UnenumeratedRights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 179
(2003).
63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg further explained
James Madison's intent in writing the Ninth Amendment by broadly stating that "[the Ninth
Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights
could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain
rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected." Id. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). This idea was not new to Madison; his belief in the limitations of language was
expressed in the Federalist Papers when he stated that "no language is so copious as to supply
words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
64. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a
belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly
enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be
deemed exhaustive.").
65. Id. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("I do not believe that [deference to the legislature]
includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens."); see also Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (explaining that a state may "serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments," but not at the expense of fundamental rights (citing New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See generally infra
Part IV.D (providing an in-depth discussion of the deferential standards Congress believes the
Court should use for the PBABA). The Court defers to legislatures' experiments in social laws
because the government "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955). At issue in Williamson was an Oklahoma statute regulating optometrists and
ophthalmologists. Id. at 484. The Court held that it is for legislature to weigh the advantages and
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Justice Harlan's concurrence focused on the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and not on the Bill of
Rights. 6 6 While Justice Harlan noted that the Bill of Rights aided his
conclusions, he believed that the Connecticut statute was an
infringement on a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 67 In so stating, Justice Harlan emphasized that judicial
restraint in interpreting the Due Process Clause should be guided by
history, a respect for basic values, and the recognition of the separation
68
of powers.
In the last concurrence, Justice White argued that the statute did not
pertain to the legitimate legislative goal of preventing illicit sexual
relationships. 69 Because Connecticut could not justify the broad nature
of the law, Justice White found that the law violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 Justice White explained that
criminalizing the use of contraceptives, or creating the offense of aiding
and abetting the use of contraceptives in no way promoted the stated
legislative goal. 7 1 Although he agreed that the law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice White did not accede that the
Connecticut statute was an invasion of 72privacy; rather, he contended
that Connecticut's statute was overbroad.
disadvantages of a new social law and determine if the law is necessary. Id. at 487. When a
legislature determines that a new law is necessary, it is not for the Court to undermine the
legislative attempt. Id. at 487-88.
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... ").
67. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the law at issue breached
the "concept of ordered liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
68. Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that judicial restraint
will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and
preserving American freedoms.
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 506 (White, J., concurring)
72. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring) (commenting that the examination of the statute provided
by the majority "cannot be avoided by saying that the Connecticut anti-use statute invades a
protected area of privacy"). Rather, Justice White concluded, "I find nothing in this record
justifying the sweeping scope of this statute, with its telling effect on the freedoms of married
persons, and therefore conclude that it deprives such persons of liberty without due process of
law." Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring). Although Justice White concurred in Griswold, he
dissented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973). Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Roe v.
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Justices Black and Stewart each wrote a dissent in Griswold and each
joined in the other's dissent. 7 3 These two Justices adopted the view that
the Framers intended the Bill of Rights to be taken literally, in that each
amendment means exactly what it says and nothing more. 74 Therefore,
according to the dissents, the right to privacy does not exist because the
Constitution does not provide explicitly for such a right. 75 In addition,
Justice Black specifically
rejected the notion that the Constitution must
76
change with the times.
Seven years after Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird found
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons but allowed distribution to
married persons. 77 Using the Court's reasoning from Griswold, that the

government should not intrude into matters such as an individual's
decision whether to bear a child, the Court held that the right to privacy
applied to single individuals as well as to married persons. 78 Therefore,
the Court found that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
statute provided privacy protection for married persons but not single
persons. 79 Additionally, the Court agreed with the lower court's
warning against a legislative attempt to circumvent the Griswold
Wade and commented that the right of "privacy" was not involved in the case. Roe, 410 U.S. at
172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 527 (Black, J., dissenting) ("So far as I am concerned, Connecticut's law as applied
here is not forbidden by any provision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution was
written .. "); id. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I can find nothing in any of [the Amendments]
to invalidate this Connecticut law, even assuming that all those Amendments are fully applicable
against the States."). Orginalists argue that the only fundamental rights are those expressly
"stated in the text [of the Constitution] or clearly intended by the framers." CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 698. In contrast, non-originalists argue that courts have
the authority to protect fundamental rights not stated explicitly in the Constitution. Id.
75. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I can find no such general right of
privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before
decided by this Court.").
76. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
78. Id. at 453.
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matter so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.
Id.
79. Id. at 454-55.
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ruling. 80 Following Eisenstadt,the next major case to discuss the right
81
to privacy was Roe v. Wade.
2.

The Abortion Cases: Roe v. Wade

In 1973, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to privacy
82

encompassed a woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion.

In Roe v. Wade, the Court analyzed a Texas statute banning all
abortions except those required to save the woman's life.8 3 The Court
found the statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court created a trimester system for
84
regulating abortion.
The Roe Court provided an extensive history of abortion beginning
86
with the Persian Empire, 85 moving through the time of Hippocrates,
and concluding with an account of the common law precedent. 87 The
Court noted that in the classic Hippocratic Oath, which doctors take
upon finishing medical school, doctors swear not to give a woman
anything that would cause abortion. 8 8 The Court provided this long

80. Id. at 450, af'g 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
81. See infra Part H.A.2-3 (examining Roe v. Wade and subsequent significant abortion
cases).

82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
83. Id. at 118.
84. Id. at 164-65. A woman is pregnant for forty weeks counting from the first day of her last
menstrual period. Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health
Perspective, in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 11, 17-18

(Maureen Paul et al. eds., 1999).

The first trimester consists of the first twelve weeks of

pregnancy. Id.

85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130 (noting that "[a]ncient religion did not bar abortion").
86. Id. at 131-32 (describing Hippocrates and the history of the Oath).
87. Id. at 132-47 (describing the law beginning in the sixteenth century and moving, in detail,
to the present). The majority opinion states that "at the time of the adoption of our Constitution,
and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than
under most American statutes currently in effect." Id. at 140. The move towards prohibiting
abortion was justified by three reasons. Id. at 142-52. First was a Victorian concern to deter
illicit sexual relationships. Id. at 148. This justification is not asserted in Roe. Id. Second, when
abortion was first criminalized, "the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman." Id. The
Court noted that this rationale no longer applied because modem medical techniques are safer
than those used in the past. Id. at 149. Last, prohibiting abortion stems from the desire to protect

prenatal life. Id. at 150. This formed the impetus for creating the trimester system. Id. at 163.
AND
OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION,
88. See LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, HIPPOCRATIC
INTERPRETATION (1943) (translating the oath as stating, "I will not give to a woman an abortive
remedy"), reprinted at NOVA ONLINE, HIPPOCRATIC OATH-CLASSICAL VERSION, at

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oathclassical.html (last updated Mar. 2001). Most
students graduating from medical school take some form of the Hippocratic Oath. See NOVA
ONLINE, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH TODAY, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/
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oathtoday.html (last updated Mar. 2001) (explaining the history and current use of the
Hippocratic Oath). The classical Hippocratic Oath doctors take states:
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the
gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfil [sic] according to my
ability and judgment this oath and this covenant:
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my life
in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, and
to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach them this
art-if they desire to learn it-without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts
and oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons and to the sons of him who
has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken an oath
according to the medical law, but no one else.
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and
judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody who asked for it, nor will I make a
suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In
purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in
favor of such men as are engaged in this work.
Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free
of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual relations with both
female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I
will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about.
If I fulfil this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and
art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and
swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.
EDELSTEIN, supra, reprinted at NOVA ONLINE, HIPPOCRATIC OATH-CLASSICAL VERSION, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbInova/doctors/oathclassical.html
(last updated Mar. 2001).
The
Hippocratic Oath is the "nucleus of all medical ethics and was applauded as the embodiment of
truth." Roe, 430 U.S. at 131; see also MATHEW L. HOWARD, Physician-PatientRelationship
(stating that the "Hippocratic oath can be thought of as a codification of rules governing the
[physician-patient relationship] the existence of which suggests that some physicians at least
needed to be bound by oath to enforce adherence to the social norm"), in ACLME LEGAL
MEDICINE 247 (S.Sandy Sanbar et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). Doctors still take a form of this oath
today, though most medical schools use a modem version.
See NOVA ONLINE, THE
HIPPOCRATIC OATH TODAY, supra (listing various forms of the modem Hippocratic Oath). The
modem form of the Hippocratic Oath does not mention abortion. NOVA ONLINE, HIPPOCRATIC
OATH-MODERN VERSION, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath-modern.html (last
updated Mar. 2001). The majority of medical schools use some variation on the modem
Hippocratic Oath.
AM. MED. ASS'N, AMA OATH REGISTRY, at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/5573.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2003). Some schools maintain a
reference to conception, such as "I will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time
of conception, even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of
humanity." E.g., LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO STRITCH SCH. OF MED., OATH OF HIPPOCRATES
(emphasis added), reprinted at AM. MED. ASS'N, OATH REGISTRY, at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/5583.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2003); see UNIV. OF TEXAS MED.
BRANCH AT GALVESTON, DECLARATION OF GENEVA, reprinted at AM. MED. ASS'N, OATH
REGISTRY, at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/6959.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2003).
Others do not reference conception or abortion directly such as "I will exercise my art solely for
the cure of my patients, and will give no drug, perform no operation for a criminal purpose, even
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history to explain the origins of abortion prohibitions and why those
reasons do not support a total ban on abortions. 8 9 The Court explained

that at common law, there was no prohibition against performing
abortions prior to "quickening." 90 Next, the Court discussed the way

English statutory law preserved the quickening time frame by providing
lesser penalties for abortion prior to quickening and greater penalties
after quickening. 9 1 The Court noted the enactment of a then recent
English law permitting abortions where three physicians agree that
carrying the pregnancy to term would cause injury to the woman's
physical or mental health. 92 The last section in the historical overview
reviewed American law, concluding that at the time of the adoption of

the Constitution, there was less negative focus on abortion than current
93

statutory law implies.
The Court then began its overview of the law by discussing the right
to privacy and ultimately held that the right of a woman to choose to
have an abortion is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the right

to privacy. 94 As such, the Court held that any regulation on abortion
must be justified by a compelling state interest. 9 5 In placing abortion
under the umbrella of fundamental liberty interests, the Court was
careful to recognize that while the State does not have a "compelling"

interest in restricting abortions, the State may have an "important"

if solicited, far less
AM. MED. ASS'N,
(last updated Dec.
reprinted
at

suggest it." E.g., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., HIPPOCRATIC OATH, reprintedat
OATH REGISTRY, at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/6763.html
9, 2003); JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. SCH. OF MED., THE PHYSICIAN'S OATH,
AM.
MED.
ASS'N,
OATH
REGISTRY,
at
http://www.ama-

assn.org/ama/pub/category/5581.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2003); UNIV. OF MICH. MED. SCH.,
HIPPOCRATIC OATH, reprinted at AM. MED. ASS'N, OATH REGISTRY, at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/5601 .html (last updated Dec. 9, 2003).
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151-52.
90. Id. at 132-33. Quickening is defined as "the first recognizable movement of the fetus in
utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy." Id. at 132. Philosophical
and theological disciplines adopted the quickening standard because it was at that point that the
fetus is "recognizably human." Id. at 133.
91. Id. at 136.
92. See id. at 137.
93. Id. at 138-47. "It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our
Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less

disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect." Id. at 140. This section detailed
when various states adopted abortion prohibitions. Id. at 138. The Court explained that "in the
middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of
most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased." Id. at 139.
94. Id. at 153 (stating that "[t]his right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a

woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
95.

Id. at 155.
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interest in restricting abortions to protect potential lives. 96 Therefore,
the Court noted that two competing interests existed: a woman's
fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and the State's
important concern for potential life. 97 The Court decided that the
competing interests produced a qualified right to privacy concerning
abortion; this qualified right ultimately led the Court to create the
98
trimester system.
In creating the trimester system, the Court looked to the text of the
Constitution and its use of the word "person." 99 The Constitution does
not define the word "person."' 10 0 In previous cases, the Court insisted
that because the Fourteenth Amendment uses the word "person," its
protections must be afforded to noncitizens, including illegal aliens, as
well as citizens. 10 1 However, the Court noted that no constitutional
reference to "person" encompasses the unborn.1 0 2 Therefore, the Court
in Roe adopted viability, the point at which the fetus can sustain life
outside the womb, as the point when a state's interest becomes
compelling and the State thus may prohibit abortion. 1 3 The Court
considered the physical and psychological well-being of the woman
seeking the abortion when creating the trimester system. 104 In sum, the
Court held that during the first trimester the State may not regulate
abortion; 10 5 during the second trimester, the State may regulate aspects
of abortion that pertain to the preservation and protection of the
96. Id. at 154. A woman's right to choose abortion emerged because the State's interest was
"important" but not "compelling." Id. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221
(1944) (holding that when a state does have a compelling interest, a fundamental right may be
suspended).
97. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
98. Id. at 163--64. The first trimester includes weeks one through twelve, the second trimester
includes weeks thirteen through twenty-six, and the third trimester includes weeks twenty-seven
through forty-two. ABOUT.COM, THREE TRIMESTER GUIDE TO PREGNANCY, at http://pregnancy.
about.com/cs/trimesterguide/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
99. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
100. Id. at 157.
101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Whatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term.").
102. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id. at 153. ("Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care."). A similar point was made by the majority opinion in the companion case
to Roe. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973) (maintaining that a health exception
includes mental health). At issue in Doe was a Georgia abortion prohibition statute. id. at 18182. The Doe opinion commented that a patient's health included "physical, emotional, [and]
psychological" components, which all play a part in a physician's medical judgment. Id. at 192.
Thus, the Court concluded that doctors may determine whether to perform an abortion based on
their "best clinical judgment." Id. at 191.
105. Id. at 163.
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woman's 106 health;107 and in the third trimester, post viability, the State
may proscribe abortion generally but must permit abortions necessary
for the "life or health" of the woman. 108
The Roe majority explained that its holding defended the rights of a
physician to provide medical attention and advice according to medical
judgment. 10 9 Because abortion is a medical procedure, the Court stated
that responsibility for abortions must remain with physicians.'1 0 Also,
the Court made clear that a doctor still would be subject11to the penalties
of the traditional medical community to prevent abuse."
The dissent in Roe, authored by Justice Rehnquist, began by
criticizing the majority for formulating a broad constitutional law in
response to a narrow question. 1 12 Justice Rehnquist explained that the
woman who brought suit in this case might have been in her third
trimester at the time of filing and that therefore the law would not apply
to her. 113 Thus, Justice Rehnquist admonished the majority for
permitting virtually no restrictions on first trimester abortions based on

106. I will not refer to "maternal" health in this Comment because that phrase implies that a
pregnant woman is already a mother. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 772 (2d
college ed. 1991) (defining maternal as "[r]elating to or characteristic of a mother or
motherhood").
107. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (noting that proper second trimester regulations relate to the
qualifications of the person who will perform the abortion and the location where the procedure
will take place).
108. Id. at 163-64 (stating that a state may prohibit all abortions after the third trimester
"except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the [woman]").
109. Id. at 166.
110. Id.; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973) (noting that physicians must be
permitted to use their clinical judgment to make abortion determinations).
111. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166 (stating that if a doctor "abuses the privilege of exercising proper
medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are available").
112. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court departs from the
longstanding admonition that it should never 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied"' (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila.
S.S. Co. v. Comm'r of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))). Justice Rehnquist disagreed with
the majority because the Court did not know what stage of pregnancy the plaintiff was in when
she filed suit. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). She would have standing to litigate the issue
presented only if she were in her first trimester at some point during the lawsuit. Id. at 172
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court's majority was
incorrect in "impos[ing] virtually no restrictions on medical abortions performed during the first
trimester" when it seemed to him to be a hypothetical question presented to the Court and not one
capable of litigation. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the record was silent as to how long the
plaintiff had been pregnant when she brought the suit). The Court stated that it knew only "that
plaintiff Roe at the time of filing her complaint was a pregnant woman; for aught that appears in
this record, she may have been in her last trimester of pregnancy as of the date the complaint was
filed." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a woman who could have been in her third trimester when she brought
114
the suit.

Next, Justice Rehnquist focused on the absence of any explicit
mention of a right to privacy in the Constitution. 115 Justice Rehnquist
commented that the majority was acting as a legislator and not as the
judiciary. 116 Justice Rehnquist further argued that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment1 17 could not have intended it to be applied to
state abortion regulation because thirty-six states and territories had
already enacted their own laws limiting abortion at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.' 1 8 Thus, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend
119
to take away state power to legislate the issue of abortion.
3.

The Abortion Cases: Moving Beyond Roe

Following Roe, the Supreme Court addressed various topics related to
120
abortion and the Due Process Clause, such as abortion procedures, 122
12 1 abortion funding,
parental consent for minors seeking abortion,
114. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra Part Il.A.1 (explaining that the right to
privacy noted in Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold is derived and not explicit in the
Constitution).
116. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the "decision here to break
pregnancy into three distinct terms... partakes more of judicial legislation that it does of a
determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment").
117. Representative John Bingham of Ohio drafted the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, except for the first sentence. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 346 (1997).
There is great controversy
regarding Representative Bingham's original intent as to how much of the Bill of Rights the
Fourteenth Amendment was supposed to incorporate. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading
John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (explaining in detail the
controversy over the Fourteenth Amendment and its origins).
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 175-76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (holding that
banning saline amniocentesis was an unconstitutional restriction on a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion).
121. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute that
required a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion); see also
Planned Parenthood,428 U.S. at 74 (stating that "the State does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for
withholding the consent" with regard to a parental consent requirement). But see Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (upholding a parental notification requirement in Minnesota
because it included a procedure for judicial waiver).
122. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding a law that prohibited the use of
public funds for abortions, except where "medically necessary"). In Maher, two indigent woman
brought suit seeking public funding for abortions. Id. at 467. The two women could not get
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anti-abortion literature, 12 3 and access to abortion clinics. 124 In Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth, the Supreme Court, for the first time, looked at
a prohibition against a particular abortion procedure. 125 At issue was

the use of saline amniocentesis in first trimester abortions. 126 The Court
held a ban on this particular procedure unconstitutional, despite the
legislative finding that performing the procedure was harmful to the
woman's health. 127 After examining the facts and figures related to the
procedure, the Court determined that a ban on this termination method
would be dangerous to a woman's health because it could require her to
choose a more dangerous method. 12 8 The Court concluded that the
legislature's decision to make this procedure illegal created an
"unreasonable" regulation "designed to inhibit," and, thus, the

legislation had to be struck down as a violation of the Court's holding in
Roe. 129

certificates qualifying their abortions as a "medical necessity." Id. The Court held that denying
indigent women funding for abortions did not contradict the holding in Roe because "[t]here is a
basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Id. at 475. The
Court focused its analysis on the legislative intent to protect potential life and encourage natural
childbirth where it will not harm the woman. Id. at 478.
123. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)
(invalidating those provisions of a city ordinance that required doctors to give their patients antiabortion information, including telling them that "the unborn child is a human life from the
moment of conception"). This case was ultimately overruled by Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
124. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (upholding
provisions of a Florida injunction that created a thirty-six-foot buffer zone outside the entrance to
a reproductive health clinic and prohibited anti-abortion protesters from making noise that could
be heard by patients inside the clinic). But see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,
385 (1997) (invalidating a provision in a New York injunction that created a fifteen-foot
"floating" buffer zone around any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving a clinic).
125. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 79 (finding unconstitutional a complete ban on
performing abortions using saline amniocentesis).
126. Id. at 75-76.

At issue in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth was a Missouri law

prohibiting doctors from using the saline amniocentesis method of abortion during the first
trimester. Id. at 76. At the time of the decision, doctors used saline amniocentesis for
approximately seventy percent of the first trimester abortions. Id. In a saline amniocentesis
abortion, the doctor withdraws the amniotic fluid and replaces it with "saline or other fluid" in the
amniotic sac. Id. There were other abortion-related questions in Danforth, but the restriction on
a particular abortion procedure is crucial for analysis of the issues discussed in this Comment.
See infra Part IV.B.3 (explaining the role of Danforth in understanding the PBABA).
127. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 76 (stating that the procedure was "deleterious to
maternal health").
128. Id. at 79 (stating that "as a practical matter, it forces a woman and her physician to
terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed").
129. Id. at 76-79.
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The Supreme Court again focused on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in its decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota.130 At
issue in Hodgson was a Minnesota statute requiring that minors obtain
the consent of both parents before getting an abortion. 13 1 However, the
State did create a judicial bypass if the minor was mature, or if it was in
her best interest not to obtain consent. 132 In finding the consent
requirement unconstitutional, the Court focused on the liberty interest of
every woman to decide whether to bear children. 13 3 In dicta, the Court
emphasized that the Due Process Clause "protects the woman's right to

make

such

unwarranted

decisions

independently

governmental

intrusion." 134

and

privately.., free

While the State

of
may

encourage childbirth over abortion by making public funds unavailable
for abortion, it may not substitute a woman's decision with its own; 135 if
the State makes the decision for the woman, then the liberty interest in
the Due Process Clause will become a "nullity."' 13 6 Thus, Hodgson
continued the Supreme Court's reverence for the Due Process Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of a woman's right to
choose. 137
Over the years, the Supreme Court continued to hand down many
abortion decisions; 138 however, commentators contend that none were

130. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990). See generally Katheryn D. Katz, The
Pregnant Child's Right to Self-determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1139-41 (1999) (discussing

the details of the Court's decision in Hodgson as it pertains to the larger question of parental
notification requirements).
131. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 424.
132. Id. at 427.
133. Id. at 434 ("A woman's decision to conceive or bear a child is a component of her liberty
that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.");
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
right of every woman to determine for herself whether to bear or beget a child).
134. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 434.
135. Id. at 435.
136. Id. (maintaining that a state may not justify "substituting a state decision for an
individual decision that a woman has a right to make herself. Otherwise, the interest in liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause would be a nullity.").
137. See id. at 435 (comparing the right to have an abortion to the right to travel and the right
to marry).
138. E.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989) (including only a
minority of the Court (four Justices) voting to reaffirm Roe); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health Serv., 462 U.S. 416, 457 (1983) (invalidating provisions of a city ordinance that
required physicians to give patients anti-abortion information, imposed a twenty-four hour
waiting period, and mandated parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77 (1976) (finding unconstitutional both a requirement for
spousal consent for abortion and the prohibition against saline amniocentesis as a method for
abortion).
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as legally and politically potent as Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.139 At

issue in Casey were five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act of 1982.140

In Casey, the Supreme Court, with Justice

O'Connor writing for the majority, reaffirmed the essential holding of
Roe while revamping the timetable for acceptable abortion
regulations. 14 1 The Court focused on Roe's central holding that a state

may proscribe abortions post viability because its interest in potential
life becomes compelling at that point. 142 In doing so, the Court adopted

the "undue burden" standard, which holds that a state may not place an
undue burden, defined as a substantial obstacle, in the path of a woman
seeking a pre-viability abortion. 143 The Court adopted that standard
because the vital issue in Casey concerned a woman's liberty, which the
Court regarded as "unique to the human condition and so unique to
law." 144 The Court recognized the importance of abortion law in
protecting the right to bodily integrity valued in this country. 145 The
Court rejected Roe's trimester framework, stating that the trimester plan
did not consider sufficiently the State's substantial interest in protecting
potential life. 14 6 However, in dicta, the majority warned that courts
139. NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 143 (1996); see Planned Parenthood

v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Sandra Lynn Tholen, Note and Comment, Con Law Is as
Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28

Loy. L.A. L. REV. 971, 1044-46 (1995) (concluding that abortion is a "hot-button" topic and the
ramifications of Casey, both legal and political, are still emerging).
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. Those five provisions included requirements that (1) there be a
twenty-four hour waiting period from the time informed consent is given to the time an abortion
is performed, (2) a minor have the informed consent of at least one parent to obtain an abortion,
and (3) a married woman seeking an abortion notify her husband of her intentions. Id.
Additionally, the fourth and fifth provisions concerned regulations on performing abortions and
reporting requirements for abortion facilities. Id.
141. Id. at 846 (stating that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once
again reaffirmed").
142. Id. at 860.
143. Id. at 877.
144. Id. at 852.
145. Id. at 857 ("Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but
as a rule ... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.");
see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 264 (1990) (asserting the right to bodily
integrity in end-of-life questions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)
(emphasizing women's right to bodily integrity by invalidating a law requiring spousal consent);
see also Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women's
Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S

L.J. 185, 201 (2003) (discussing a woman's right to bodily integrity when she becomes pregnant
through artificial insemination).
146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 ("The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in
potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulation must be deemed unwarranted. Not all
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.").
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must not evaluate abortion laws based on personal moral aversions to
abortion. 147 Thus, the majority upheld and restated the critical elements
of Roe while also revamping the method for evaluating abortion
regulations. 14 8 Furthermore, the Casey Court reaffirmed that the
Constitution promises a right to privacy, which encompasses a sphere of
149
liberty free from government intrusion.
The dissenting justices in Casey focused on two arguments: first, that
Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided; 150 and second, that a
constitutionally protected right to privacy does not exist.' 5 1 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, contended that Roe v. Wade was
decided wrongly because there was no historical evidence that abortion
was a fundamental right. 152 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the
153
holding in Roe misapplied "right to privacy" holdings to abortion.
Abortion must be analyzed differently from other privacy cases, he
explained, because abortion decisions affect not only the woman, but
also the fetus. 154 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also
criticized the majority's limited use of stare decisis, noting that the
majority retained the central holding from Roe but rejected the other
major components of that decision. 155 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that Casey did not require a discussion or reaffirmation of Roe

147. See id. at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.").
148. Id. at 846.
149. Id. at 847 (stating that the liberty interest in privacy "is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter").
150. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We believe that
Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our
traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.").
151. Id. at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that
prior opinions on marriage, child rearing, and contraception did not create an "all encompassing"
right to privacy).
152. Id. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kevin
Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier'sRight to Abortion,
70 FORDHAM L. REv. 93, 133 n.216 (explaining Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Casey).
153. Casey, 505 U.S. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(commenting that the Court in Roe should not have analogized abortion to the privacy rights in
Pierce, Meyer, Loving, and Griswold); see supra Part II.A. 1 (discussing this history of the critical
right of privacy cases).
154. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("One
cannot ignore the fact that a woman is not isolated in her pregnancy, and that the decision to abort
necessarily involves the destruction of a fetus.").
155. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (commenting on the
"newly minted variation on stare decisis"); id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("The Court's reliance upon stare decisis can best be described as contrived.").
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was an abortion "regulation" and not an
because the issue in Casey
56
abortion "prohibition." 1
The undue burden standard from Casey defines the way courts
currently analyze abortion regulations. 157 The undue burden standard
applies both to obstacles in "obtaining an abortion once abortion has
been chosen" and obstacles that "undermine a woman's decision
whether to have an abortion" at all. 158 The Supreme Court used this
standard in Stenberg v. Carhart when it invalidated Nebraska's law
banning "partial birth abortions."' 159 Before outlining the details of
Stenberg, this Comment will briefly explain the various abortion
procedures available during each trimester that are necessary to
160
understand the Court's decision.
B. Abortion Proceduresin Medicine and Law

1. First Trimester
According to medical opinion, in the beginning weeks of pregnancy,
a woman can choose to use medical abortion as opposed to surgical

156. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (retaining the
use of the undue burden standard for reviewing abortion regulations); A Woman's Choice-E.
Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (using the undue burden test
as defined in Stenberg v. Carhart to analyze an abortion regulation); Planned Parenthood of
Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 919 (10th Cir. 2002) (maintaining that
the undue burden standard in Casey is appropriate in abortion cases).
158. Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connor and Due
Process Rights of Choice, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 895, 911 (2001).
159. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000).
160. See infra Part 11.B.1-2 (outlining the abortion options for the first and second trimesters).
In discussing these abortion procedures, this Comment will employ the medical language used in
the majority opinion in Stenberg. The majority explained its decision to use this language by
stating:
Considering the fact that those procedures seek to terminate a potential human life, our
discussion may seem clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others.
There is no alternative way, however, to acquaint the reader with the technical
distinctions among different abortion methods and related factual matters, upon which
the outcome of this case depends. For that reason, drawing upon the findings of the
trial court, underlying testimony, and related medical texts, we shall describe the
relevant methods of performing abortions in technical detail.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923. It should be noted, however, that Justice Kennedy, in his dissent,
criticized the majority's discussion, arguing that "[w]ords invoked by the majority, such as
'transcervical procedures,' 'osmotic dilators,' 'instrumental disarticulation,' and 'paracervical
block,' may be accurate and are to some extent necessary, but for citizens who seek to know why
laws on this subject have been enacted across the Nation, the words are insufficient." Id. at 957
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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abortion. 16 1 Medical abortion involves inducing abortion through the

introduction of a medication; this can be done safely until the sixty-third
day of gestation.1 6 2 The advantage to medical abortion is that there are
few medical complications associated with the procedure. 16 3 The
disadvantage is that a woman must be willing to undergo surgical
abortion if medical abortion is not successful and the abortion is
64
incomplete. 1
During the first trimester, the most common and safest form of

surgical abortion is dilation and suction curettage ("D & C");' 65 in some
texts this method is called vacuum aspiration. 166 To perform this
procedure, the doctor dilates the cervix and inserts a small pointed
vacuum, which extracts the contents of the uterus. 16 7 The second
method of first trimester surgical abortion, dilation and curettage, is
generally not practiced where vacuum aspiration is available. 168 In this
procedure, the doctor dilates the cervix and scrapes the uterine wall
using sharp metal curettes. 16 9 The risks associated with dilation and
curettage, such as puncturing the uterine wall and infection, are reduced
170
by using the vacuum aspiration method.

161. See Mitchell D. Creinen & Elizabeth Aubrny, Medical Abortion in Early Pregnancy
(explaining the history and technique of medical abortion), in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL
AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 91, 91.
162. Id. at 98-99. However, it is important to note that the surgical method may be preferable
for women with pregnancies over forty-nine days' gestation. Id. at 99. Gestational age is
calculated "from the first day of the last menstrual period... or 2 weeks before the estimated date
of conception." Henshaw, supra note 84, at 17.
163. Creinen & Aubfny, supra note 161, at 97. Furthermore, "[w]omen are not optimal
candidates for medical abortion if they do not wish to participate in their abortion or take
responsibility for their care, are anxious to have the abortion over quickly, cannot return for
follow-up visits, or cannot understand the instructions because of language or comprehension
barriers." Id.
164. Id.
165. See generally Creinen & Aubdny, supra note 161, at 91; Jerry Edwards et al., Surgical
Abortion in the First Trimester (explaining medical and surgical abortion in the earliest stages of
pregnancy), in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at
107.
166. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 32 (explaining the vacuum aspiration
method); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000) (explaining that vacuum
aspiration is a particularly safe procedure).
167. See Edwards et al., supra note 165, at 111-12 (describing the vacuum aspiration
procedure).
168. Carole Joffe, Abortion in Historical Perspective, in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL
AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 3, 5.
169. Id.; see also JONATHAN B. IMBER, ABORTION AND THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE 58 (1986) (noting that prior to 1973, dilation and curettage was the most frequently
used method of surgical abortion but the vacuum aspirator method has since proven safer).
170. IMBER, supra note 169, at 58.
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2. After the First Trimester
In second trimester abortions, generally at thirteen to twenty-four
weeks gestation, the safest procedure is dilation and evacuation
("D & E").17 ' In this procedure, a doctor dilates the woman's cervix,
sometimes over a two-day period. 172 The use of dilators for the day or
two prior to the surgical procedure may cause fetal death. 173 After

dilation, the doctor uses forceps to extract the contents of the uterus; this
procedure requires insertion of the forceps repeatedly unless an intact
D & E is performed. 174 With an intact D & E, the doctor extracts the
fetus intact, not in separated parts. 175 An intact D & E is a safer
procedure because it is less likely to puncture the uterine wall or cause
infection by repeated instrument passes. 17 6 Removing the fetus intact
allows a physician to examine fetal abnormalities, and patients may find

comfort in seeing the intact fetus. 177

D & E offers an abortion

technique that is relatively comfortable, private, safe, and not cost
prohibitive. 178 Of the 1% of abortions performed in the United States
after twenty weeks gestation, 80% of them are performed using both
intact and non-intact D & E, leaving 0.2% of all abortions to other late
79
term methods. 1
Doctors can also use the labor-induction method after the first
trimester, although most medical professionals agree that the D & E
171. W. Martin Haskell, SurgicalAbortion After the FirstTrimester, in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE
TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 123-24 [hereinafter Haskell, Surgical
Abortion]; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 924 (2000) ("The most commonly used
procedure is called dilation and evacuation."); Martin Haskell, Dilation and Extractionfor Late
Second TrimesterAbortion (explaining that another procedure generally is performed after twenty
weeks gestational age, before which D & E usually is performed), reprinted in 139 CONG. REC.
E1092 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993).
172. Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 127-28. The cervix must be dilated so the
fetal skull, the largest part of the fetus, can pass through. Id. Following the Roe decision,
mortality rates associated with D & E dropped from 10.4 per 100,000 (for the years 1972 to 1976)
to 3.3 per 100,000 (for the years 1977 to 1982). Id. at 124.
173. Id. at 131. See generally Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924 (explaining the details of the D & E
procedure).
174. Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 135.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 136 ("Intactness allows unhampered evaluation of structural abnormalities and can
be an aid to patients grieving a wanted pregnancy by providing the opportunity for a final act of
bonding.").
178. Id. at 137.
179. Id. at 123. However, no one is exactly sure of statistical numbers showing the frequency
of this or any other abortion procedure. See Media Matters: Partial Truths (PBS television
broadcast, Jan. 1997) (discussing the biases of the news media in reporting on abortion),
transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/mediamatters99/transcript2.htm
(last visited
June 16, 2004).
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For labor induction, doctors administer a

medication that causes labor to begin. 18 1 Usually the fetus is aborted

within twenty-four hours, although studies show that the length of time
to
varies. 182 The risks associated with labor induction include damage
183
induction.
failed
and
infection,
hemorrhaging,
cervix,
and
the uterus
Hysterotomy is another method available beyond the first trimester,
although doctors almost never use this method because of its high
mortality rate. 184 In layman's terms, hysterotomy is like a pre-term
caesarian section. 185 D & E usually is a safer choice unless there is an
86
emergency situation.1

The abortion method at issue in Stenberg v. Carhartand the PBABA
is called dilation and extraction ("D & X"). 187 It is nearly identical to
D & E except that D & X is used when the fetal skull is too large to fit
through the cervix, so the doctor drains the fluid in the skull before
188
completing the intact D & E.
3. Stenberg and the "Partial Birth" Abortion
The Nebraska statute in Stenberg focused on the abortion method of
D & X. 189 In D & X, a doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix,
then removes the contents of the fetal skull and continues to perform a

180. Paul D. Blumenthal et al., Abortion by Labor Induction ("Compared to induction
abortion, dilation and evacuation (D&E) has generally been recognized as the safest and most
expeditious means of pregnancy termination for similar gestational ages, especially prior to 20
weeks."), in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at

139.
181. Id. at 143-45 (explaining some of the various medications used to induce labor,
including hypertonic saline, hyperosmolar urea, oxytocin, and prostaglandins).
182. Id. at 144.
183. Id.
184. Haskell, Surgical Abortion, supra note 171, at 126 (noting that fatality rates are thirteen
times higher for hysterotomy). See generally Janeen F. Berkowitz, Stenberg v. Carhart: Women
Retain Their Right To Choose, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 337, 354 (2000) (explaining the

hysterotomy and the hysterectomy procedures).
185.

See Karen E. Walther, Partial-BirthAbortion: Should Moral Judgment Prevail over

Medical Judgment?, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 693, 697-701 (2000) (explaining the various abortion
procedures).
186. Haskell, Surgical Abortion, supra note 171, at 126 (explaining that
"hysterotomy/hysterectomy may be the best choice in life-threatening medical crises such as
unremitting hemorrhage associated with placenta accreta, massive disseminated intravascular
coagulation (DIC), or severe forms of preemclapsia").
187. See generally infra Part I.B.3 (explaining D & X and its application in Stenberg).
188. See generally infra note 190 (noting the description of D & X used by the Supreme
Court).
189. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 928 (2000).
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delivery of a dead but intact fetus. 190 This procedure commonly is
known as "partial birth" abortion, although almost all medical books
and journals do not use the term. 19 1 Instead, the term emerged in the
1990s, when abortion opponents used the term "partial birth" abortion
92
to describe the D & X method and promote their viewpoint. 1
In Stenberg, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court held a
Nebraska statute banning partial birth abortion unconstitutional. 19 3 The
190. Id. (noting a statement issued by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists Executive Board and describing the procedure as "partial evacuation of the
intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact
fetus").
191. Gail Glidewell, Note, "PartialBirth" Abortion and the Health Exception: Protecting
Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1095 (2001)
(stating that ."partial birth' abortion ...is not a medically recognized term" (citing Planned
Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (D. Ariz. 1997))). But see
MERRIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2003) (defining "partial-birth abortion" as "an
abortion in the second or third trimester of pregnancy in which the death of the fetus is induced
after it has passed partway through the birth canal"), available at http://www2.merriamwebster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=partial-birth%20abortion (last visited June
16, 2004).
192. Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1095. To promote opposition to abortion, abortion

opponents also have asked questions such as, "Is little Samuel's hand the hand of a person... or
is it the hand of a piece of property?" Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Bill To Prohibit
Type of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A32, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
New York Times File; see also PRO-LIFE AM., HOMEPAGE-FACTS ON ABORTION, at
http://www.prolife.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (publishing pictures of the various stages of

fetal development to defend the "pro-life" standpoint). The National Right to Life organization
equates the media's use of the phrase "partial birth abortion" to define a particular abortion
procedure with the use of the term "heart attack" to "define myocardial infarction." Letter from
Douglas Johnson, Legislative Director, National Right to Life Committee, The Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act-Misconceptions and Realities (Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Johnson Letter],
reprinted at NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE, THE PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT-

MISCONCEPTIONS AND REALITIES, at http://www.nrlc.org/abortiori/pba/PBAall10403.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2004).
193. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, which
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 919. Justices Stevens,

O'Connor, and Ginsburg filed concurring opinions. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 919. Justice Stevens's
concurrence focused on upholding the central tenants of Roe. Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In addition, Justice Stevens stated that "it [is] impossible for me to understand how a State has
any legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than the one that he or
she reasonably believes will best protect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional liberty."
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg emphasized in her concurrence that the banned
procedure was not any more gruesome than the procedures permitted by the State and therefore
could not be banned. Id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented,

briefly arguing that Casey was wrongly decided and then concurring with Justice Kennedy's and
Justice Thomas's dissents. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented,
reiterating his disagreement with Casey and further explaining that the "undue burden" standard
was misapplied here. Id. at 953-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also dissented,
focusing his argument on Nebraska's right, under Casey, to value the potential life of the fetus.

Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas's dissent was premised on his opinion that
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Court listed two reasons for finding the law unconstitutional: first, the
law lacked a proper exception to provide for the health of the woman;
and second, the language of the law applied to both D & X and D & E
procedures and therefore posed an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose the D & E procedure. 194 The Court began by noting that Casey
requires that all abortion regulations, whether pre- or post viability,
include a health exception. 195 Including a health exception would not
hinder the State's articulated goals of "prevent[ing] cruelty to partially
born children" or "preserv[ing] the integrity of the medical profession,"
the Court explained. 19 6 However, the State of Nebraska proffered eight
reasons why its statute did not need a health exception, each of which
19 7
the Court found insufficient.
Nebraska first argued that its statute did not need a health exception
because women rarely use the procedure. 198 The Court, however,
rejected this argument, explaining that a state cannot legislate against a
particular treatment simply by maintaining that most people do not need
20 0
it. 199 Second, Nebraska contended that very few doctors use D & X.
The Court responded that the number of doctors who perform this
abortion method is not related to whether it is necessary for the health of
the woman.20 1 Third, Nebraska argued that D & E and labor induction
are always safe alternative procedures. 20 2 However, the Court deferred
to the record and amicus briefs maintaining that there were times when
D & X was a safer procedure for particular women. 20 3 Fourth,
Nebraska asserted that banning the procedure would not increase the

Roe was wrongly decided and that the Court here misapplied the Casey standard. Id. at 980-81

(Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 930.
195. Id. See generally supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Casey).
196. Brief for Petitioners at 48, Stenberg (No. 99-880).
197. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 933-34.
198. Id. at 933.
199. Id. at 934.
200. Id. at 933.
201. Id. at 934.
202. Id. at 933.
203. Id. at 934; see Amicus Brief of American College of Obstetricians et al. in Support of
Respondent at 22-23, Stenberg (No. 94-830) [hereinafter ACOG Brief] ("D & X may also be the
most appropriate abortion method in the presence of certain fetal ... abnormalities, such as
hydrocephalus because it entails reducing the size of the fetal skull 'to allow a smaller diameter to
pass through the cervix, thus reducing risk of cervical injury."'), available at 2000 WL 340117;
see also Amicus Brief of NARAL Foundation et al. at 26, Stenberg (No. 94-830) [hereinafter
NARAL Brief] (emphasizing that "[t]he right to choose to have an abortion includes the right to
choose the safest procedure available for each individual woman"), available at 2000 WL
340123.
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risk of abortion complications. 20 4 Contrary to Nebraska's assertions,
the Court relied on expert testimony showing that banning the
procedure could increase a woman's risk of several rare abortion
complications. 20 5 Fifth, Nebraska claimed that D & X might create

some risks that are not present in other procedures. 20 6 Conversely, Dr.
Carhart's amicus brief claimed that other procedures involve similar or7
20
greater risks that also arise from sharp instruments in the uterus.
Sixth, the State argued there were no medical studies showing the safety
of the D & X procedure. 20 8 The Court did not disagree with the
argument concerning whether studies had been conducted on the topic
of D & X, but the fact that there were no studies did not persuade the
Court to permit the prohibition of the procedure. 20 9 Seventh, Nebraska
directed the Court's attention to an American Medical Association
policy statement that confirmed that there were no times when D & X
would be the only appropriate medical abortion procedure. 2 10 In
response, the Court simply stated that the law required a health
exception because there was conflicting medical testimony on the
issue. 2 11 Lastly, Nebraska put forth a statement by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists claiming that circumstances
never require D & X as the only option to save the woman's life.2 12
204. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 933.
205. Id. at 934-35. See generally supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting the risks
associated with prohibiting D & X).
206. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 933.
207. Id. at 935. The brief discusses the risks associated with changing the position of the
fetus, with performing a nonintact D & E, and with the amount of dilation required to remove the
fetus intact. ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 23-24. However, as the brief further explains, Dr.
Carhart did not change the position of the fetus during a D & X. Id. Additionally, the amount of
dilation is not dangerous in and of itself because it is still a lesser dilation than is required during
birth. Id.
208. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 933.
209. Id. at 935.
210. Id. at 934. For the complete language of the American Medical Association policy, see
AM. MED. ASS'N, LATE TERM PREGNANCY TERMINATION TECHNIQUES (AMA Policy H-5.982
1997), available at http://www.ama-assn.org (last visited May 18, 2004). The policy states,
According to the scientific literature, there does not appear to be any identified
situation in which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to induce abortion, and
ethical concerns have been raised about intact D&X. The AMA recommends that the
procedure not be used unless alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the
woman. The physician must, however, retain the discretion to make that judgment,
acting within standards of good medical practice and in the best interest of the patient.
Id.
211. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 935. The Court commented that although the beginning of the
AMA statement steered away from allowing D & X, the remainder of the statement provided an
important exception for when alternatives posed greater risks to the woman. Id.
212. Id. at 934.
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The Court replied that because the testimony was inconclusive
concerning whether D & X was ever a better option for a woman
seeking an abortion, the Court could not proscribe it without a health
in arguing that the late term
exception. 2 13 Thus, Nebraska 2failed
14
abortion ban was valid as written.
The Court in Stenberg rejected the notion that the Nebraska law did
not need a health exception and in fact used the health requirement
reasoning from Casey.2 15 In Casey, the Court defined the health
exception as "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment" for the
health of the woman seeking the abortion. 2 16 Yet, this phrase does not
mean that all doctors must agree on whether a D & X abortion is
necessary for a particular woman. 2 17 Instead, the Court commented that
it must rule with the uncertainty of the medical field in mind; as the
Court noted, the worst case scenario was that the exception proved
2 18
unnecessary.
The Supreme Court also held that the Nebraska law was
unconstitutional because, using the Casey standard, it imposed an undue
burden on a woman choosing abortion. 2 19 The Court explained that the
statute imposed an undue burden because the language of the statute
rendered it applicable to both the D & X and D & E procedures. 2 20 The
dissent argued that the legislature intended the law to apply only to the
D & X procedure and, therefore, it did not unduly burden a woman's

213. Id. at 937.
[T]he uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who believe that D & X is a
safer abortion method in certain circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then the
absence of a health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of tragic health
consequences. If they are wrong, the exception will simply turn out to have been
unnecessary.
Id.
214. See generally supra notes 195-213 (explaining the step-by-step analysis and rejection of

Nebraska's arguments).
215. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938.
216. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973)).
217. See Barry L. Bostrom, 16 IssuEs L. & MED. 179, 181 (2000) (stating that "'necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the.., health of the mother' cannot refer to absolute proof or

require unanimity of medical opinion" (citation omitted)).
218.

See id. (discussing the Stenberg majority's reasoning about the uncertainty of medical

evidence).
219. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938; see also supra notes 139-59 (discussing the Court's adoption
of the undue burden standard in Casey and its application to all abortion prohibitions); supra note
157 and accompanying text (showing how the courts have maintained the undue burden standard
since Casey).
220. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938.
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right to choose the D & E procedure. 221 However, the majority rejected
this argument, stating that the intent was irrelevant and that courts must
222
evaluate statutes on their plain meaning.
The Court further noted that the statute was overbroad because it did
223
not explain adequately why the statute would not apply to D & E.
The Court noted that when a doctor performs D & E, the doctor will

pull a limb of a still-living fetus through the cervix, fulfilling the

"substantial portion" requirement the law prohibits. 224 The Nebraska
law did not define "substantial portion," and the Court declined to rely
on the argument of the Attorney General that it meant fetal body "up to
the head. 225 Intact D & E is nearly indistinguishable from D & X, the
Court explained, and at times doctors prefer the D & X abortion
method. 22 6 On the rare occasions that doctors perform the late term
intact procedure, it is often used because a fetus has been found to have
a disease that is incompatible with life outside the womb.2 27 In sum, the
Court stated that arguments for upholding the law did not explain how
bringing the fetus through the vagina in D & X is a "delivery" while

performing the same act in D & E is not. 228

Thus, Nebraska's

arguments failed to persuade the majority that the Nebraska statute

221. Id. at 939 ("[T]he dissenters' argument that the law was generally intended to bar D & X
can be both correct and irrelevant ....The plain language covers both procedures."); see id. at
989 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I think it is clear that the Nebraska statute does not prohibit the
D & E procedure.").
222. Id. at 939.
223. Id. at 943 (stating that the language of the Nebraska statute seemed to apply to both
D & X and D & E).
224. Id. at 939 (stating that "D & E will often involve a physician pulling a 'substantial
portion' of a still living fetus, say, an arm or leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the fetus"
(quoting the district court's opinion, Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1128 (D. Neb.
1998))). See generally infra notes 340-42 and accompanying text (describing the "substantial
portion" requirement at issue in the PBABA).
225. Id. at 943 (stating that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute, that the statute
refers only to the fetal body "up to the head," is contrary to the "substantial portion" requirement
of the statute).
226. Id. at 928-29.
227. Id. at 929 ("[lintact D & X may be preferred by some physicians, particularly when the
fetus has been diagnosed with hydrocephaly or other anomalies incompatible with life outside the
womb." (citing the district court's opinion Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1107, which
quoted a report issued by the American Medical Association)); see also Haskell, supra note 171,
at 124 (giving examples of fetal anomalies that may necessitate collapsing the skull of a fetus that
otherwise could not sustain live outside the womb).
228. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 944.
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banning one method of abortion was constitutional
and did not impose
229
an undue burden on a woman's right to choose.
4. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Stenberg

Justice O'Connor's concurrence echoed the majority, finding the
Nebraska law inconsistent with Casey.2 30 Justice O'Connor explicitly

mentioned that an exception in the bill did not qualify as a health
exception. 23 1 However, Justice O'Connor noted that other states
enacted laws proscribing D & X in a constitutionally acceptable
manner.2 32 Justice O'Connor stated that she would uphold a ban on late
term abortion procedures if the ban explicitly described the D & X
procedure, prohibited only the D & X procedure, and included an
exception for the life or health of the woman. 2 33 In effect, Justice

O'Connor gave legislators a blueprint for a constitutional ban on
34
2
D & X.

229. Id. at 945-46 ("All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear
prosecution, conviction and imprisonment. The result is an undue burden upon a woman's right
to make an abortion decision.").
230. Id. at 947 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 139-59 (discussing
Casey).
231. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (maintaining that the law's
language excepting those procedures "necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury" was not sufficient to
render the law constitutional (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 1999))). Justice
O'Connor does not explain what would constitute a proper health exception, although many have
put forth ideas. See infra notes 492-96 and accompanying text (explaining what might constitute
a proper health exception).
232. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 950 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Kansas has a statute banning
"partial birth abortion on a viable fetus." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (2002). The statute's
language specifically excepts vacuum aspiration ("suction curettage" in the language of the
statute), D & C, and D & E. Id. Utah has a similar provision excepting the same three abortion
procedures from the prohibition. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (2003). Montana takes a
different approach and lists the step-by-step abortion process to explain the exact procedure that
is prohibited. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (2003).
233. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "a ban on partial birth
abortion that only proscribed the D & X method of abortion and that included an exception to
preserve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional").
234. Id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES,
supra note 31, at 807 ("Through her concurrence, Justice O'Connor sent a message to legislators
about how to draft a constitutional ban."). The vote in Stenberg was 5-4; thus, a legislative
attempt to rewrite a prohibition on abortion would be found constitutional if Justice O'Connor
were to vote with the dissenters from Stenberg. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922. In contrast to
Justice O'Connor's opinion, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens did not make such
explicit statements concerning the possibility of upholding a law proscribing D & X. id. at 920.
In fact, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, in which Justice Stevens joined, heeded a warning from
Judge Posner that the ban on abortion procedures is an attempt to slowly remove the right to
privacy encompassing abortion safeguarded by Roe v. Wade. Id. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(stating that bans on abortion procedures are intended to "chip away at the private choice shielded
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III. DISCUSSION
In 2003, after several unsuccessful attempts, Congress finally passed
the PBABA, which prohibits a physician from performing the act
commonly known as "partial birth" abortion. 23 5 Specifically, this Act
prohibits the late term D & X procedure that requires a physician to
intentionally deliver a living fetus through the cervix to perform an act
is
that kills the fetus. 236 The law exempts any termination that 237
necessary to save a woman's life arising from any physical condition.
This Part first details the history of the PBABA in Congress, including
the findings from four previous attempts to pass a similar bill. 238 Next,
this Part explains selected state law history leading up to the
PBABA. 239 Last, this Part examines and explores the PBABA and each
240
of its components.
A. History: CongressionalPrecedent
One or both houses of Congress passed bills similar to the PBABA in
each of the four previous congressional sessions, and President Clinton
twice vetoed the bills. 24 1 Representative Charles T. Canady from

by Roe v. Wade"); see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881-82 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (asserting that the ban on D & X was in place "not because the procedure kills the
fetus, not because it risks worse complications for the woman than alterative procedures would
do, not because it is a crueler or more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a
pregnancy," but because the State wished to prohibit abortion), vacated by 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
235. Ron Hutcheson, Bush Oks Law Limiting Abortion; Supporters Cheered, but the Law
Banning a ControversialType of Late-term Abortion ProcedureWas Quickly Challenged in Neb.,
N.Y. and Calif., PHILA. INQ., Nov. 6, 2003, at A01, availableat 2003 WL 66945843.
236. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(l)(A)). The statute prohibits the procedure
whereby a doctor
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the
body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows
will kill the partially delivered living fetus.
Id. See generally supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the D & X procedure).
237. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (providing an exemption for an abortion "that is
necessary to save the life of a [woman] whose life [is] endangered by a physical disorder,
physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or
arising from the pregnancy itself").
238. See infra Part III.A (discussing the congressional precedent for the PBABA).
239. See infra Part LI.B (discussing state law precedent for the PBABA).
240. See infra Part ILI.C (discussing components of the PBABA).
241. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002, H.R. 4965, 107th Cong. § 1531 (2002)
(passed by the House of Representatives); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2000, H.R. 3660,
106th Cong. § 1531 (2000) (passed by the House of Representatives); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 1999, S. 1692, 106th Cong. § 1531 (1999) (passed by the Senate); Partial-Birth Abortion
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Florida first introduced the bill known as the "Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 1995. ",242 Media attention accompanied the bill as it went
through committees in both houses of Congress, analyzing whether
Congress could override a presidential veto. 2 43 Ultimately, the House
passed the bill by a veto-proof margin of 288-139,244 but the Senate was
unable to pass it by such a margin, voting only 54-44 to pass the bill.2 45
President Clinton vetoed this bill, contending that it did not contain a

proper exception for the life and health of the woman seeking an
abortion. 246 Opponents of the bill applauded President Clinton's veto,
saying it would protect a woman's right to choose and prevent "back
alley" abortions. 2 47 However, others argued that if Congress added
President Clinton's health exception to the law, the law would allow

Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 1531 (1997) (vetoed by President Clinton); PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 1531 (1996) (vetoed by President
Clinton).
242. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
243. See Ann Maclean Massie, So-called "Partial-BirthAbortion" Bans: Bad Medicine?
Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PrIT. L. REV. 301, 323 n.97 (1998) (listing articles that
discuss past versions of the PBABA).
244. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 756,
at http://clerk.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=-1995&rollnumber=-756
(last visited May 18,
2004).
245. Senate Bill Clerk, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 104th Congress, 1st Session, at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfm.cfm?congress=104&sess
ion=l&vote-00596 (last visited May 17, 2004). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2
(providing Congress the ability to override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote of the
members of both houses); Massie supra note 243, at 323-27 (explaining in detail the way the first
two Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Acts were passed).
246. See Carol Jouzaitis, Clinton Vetoes Late-term Abortion Curb, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 1996,
at 3 (noting President Clinton's position against the bill because of its lack of a health exception),
availableat 1996 WL 2660913; see also Alter Bill To Allow Late Abortion if Woman's Health at
Risk, Clinton Asks, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 1996, at 8 [hereinafter Alter Bill] (paraphrasing President
Clinton's writings that "he would support the measure if it were amended to make clear that the
ban would not apply if a doctor considered the abortion method necessary to preserve the life of
the woman or avert serious health consequences to the woman" (internal quotations omitted)),
availableat 1996 WL 2648091.
247. Ann Devroy, Late-term Abortion Ban Vetoed; 'Small but Vulnerable' Group of Women
Needs ProcedureClinton Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at S8 (noting that pro-choice groups
applauded the President's veto in the wake of a congressional desire to return women to the "back
alleys"), available at 1996 WL 3073599; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning that the
result of regulating abortion would be "that every year hundreds of thousands of women, in
desperation, would defy the law, and place their health and safety in the unclean and
unsympathetic hands of back-alley abortionists, or they would attempt to perform abortions upon
themselves, with disastrous results"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 338 (1980) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (commenting that if women are not permitted to get the abortions they need, they will
have to resort to "back alley butchers" or attempt to induce abortion on themselves using "crude
and dangerous methods").
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late term abortions to be "performed for depression and other purely
2 48
psychological reasons and on healthy underage mothers."
The second time both houses passed the bill, it suffered the same fate:
the Senate was unable to provide the two-thirds vote required to
overturn a presidential veto. 249 Again, President Clinton vetoed the bill
250
because it lacked a health exception.
The third attempt at passing a form of this controversial bill came in
the 106th Congress, when both Houses of Congress passed the bill but
in different versions. 2 5 1 The Senate version of the bill, passed in 1999
at the first session of the term, included "Findings" sections agreeing to
uphold the Roe decision. 252 The House version had no "Findings"

248. Alter Bill, supra note 246 (quoting the anti-abortion group, the National Right to Life
Committee); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (noting that
prohibitions on abortion post viability are permitted "provided the life and or health of the mother
is not at stake").
249. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997), at http://thomas.loc.gov
(showing all major committee and full house votes pertaining to the bill). This timeline also
shows that Congress could not override the Presidential veto. Id. The House of Representatives
voted initially to pass the bill 295-136 and then was able to override the veto 295-131. Id. The
Senate initially voted 64-36 to pass the bill. Id. With the identical vote after the Presidential
veto, the Senate was three votes short of the ability to override a veto. Id. Representative Gerald
Solomon introduced the bill. Id.
250. Alissa J. Rubin, Bill To Ban Abortion Method Vetoed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at A22
(noting the statute's lack of a health exception), availableat 1997 WL 13988747.
251. See An Act To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Ban Partial-Birth Abortions,
H.R. 3660, 106th Cong. (2000) (providing the House version of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2000, passed in the second session of the 106th term), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong-bills&docid=f:h3660
eh.txt.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004); An Act To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Ban
Partial-Birth Abortions, S. 1692, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing the Senate version of the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 1999, passed in the first session of the 106th term, including a findings
section that had not been included in either of the prior two bills sent to President Clinton),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong-bills&docid=
f:s1692es.txt.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004). The findings section makes explicit reference to a
commitment to uphold the Roe decision. S. 1692. Senator Rick Santorum sponsored the bill.
Bill Summary & Status, S. 1692, 106th Cong. (1999), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
252. S. 1692 §§ 3-5, at 4-6.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ROE V. WADE AND PARTIAL
BIRTH ABORTION BANS.
(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds that(1) abortion has been a legal and constitutionally protected medical
procedure throughout the United States since the Supreme Court decision in
Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 (1973)); and
(2) no partial birth abortion ban shall apply to a partial-birth abortion that
is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, illness, or injury.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that partial birth
abortions are horrific and gruesome procedures that should be banned.
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out as the
section. 25 3 Public consternation about the bill did not die
2 54
presidential campaigns increased in the 2000 election year.
The fourth attempt to pass a version of this bill occurred in the 107th

Congress in 2002.255 This House bill, like its Senate predecessor from
the 106th Congress, contained a findings section, though this time the
section was far more extensive than the brief paragraphs 2 56 offered by

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING A WOMAN'S LIFE AND
HEALTH.
It is the sense of the Congress that, consistent with the rulings of the Supreme
Court, a woman's life and health must always be protected in any reproductive health
legislation passed by Congress.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ROE V. WADE.
(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds that(1) reproductive rights are central to the ability of women to exercise their
full rights under Federal and State law;
(2) abortion has been a legal and constitutionally protected medical
procedure throughout the United States since the Supreme Court decision in
Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 (1973));
(3) the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade established
constitutionally based limits on the power of States to restrict the right of a
woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy; and
(4) women should not be forced into illegal and dangerous abortions as
they often were prior to the Roe v. Wade decision.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that(1) Roe v. Wade was an appropriate decision and secures an important
constitutional right; and
(2) such decision should not be overturned.
Id.
253. H.R. 3660; see also 146 CONG. REC. H1773 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Lee) (noting Congresswoman Jackson Lee's desire to amend the bill and her statement that she
was "distressed that this committee refused to even consider any amendments to such a
momentous piece of legislation that would essentially eradicate a women's [sic] freedom of
choice as we have known it for over 25 years"); 146 CONG. REC. H1772 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Paul) (noting Congressman Paul's disagreement with the Roe decision, stating,
"[W]e are indeed on the slippery slope toward euthanasia and human experimentation. Although
the real problem lies within the hearts and minds of the people, the legal problems of protecting
life stems from the ill-advised Roe v. Wade ruling, a ruling that constitutionally should never have
occurred.").
254. See generally Ellen Goodman, Editorial, The Votes We Need To Count in November,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2000, at A23 (discussing the importance of the late term abortion issue
in the 2000 presidential election), available at 2000 WL 3332708; Loraine Kenny, Editorial, My
Views Distorted on 'Viable' Abortion, WALL. ST. J., May 15, 2000, at A51 (responding to other
letters to the editor defining the word "viable" as it pertains to abortion), availableat 2000 WLWSJ 3029396; Mark Salo, Opinion, The Abortion Battle Is Not About Substance, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Apr. 25, 2000, at B7:2 (expressing concern over the not-yet-decided Stenberg
decision's ability to overturn Roe), availableat 2000 WL 13961097.
255. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002, H.R. 4965, 107th Cong. § 1531 (2002).
256. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing the previous findings sections).
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the Senate in the 106th Congress. 25 7 However, the session ended before
the Senate voted on the 2002 bill.2 5 8
Finally, the 108th Congress passed the PBABA with the necessary
votes to override a presidential veto in the House but not the Senate,
though no override was necessary as President Bush signed the bill into
law. 259 The PBABA included findings nearly identical to those in the
260
2002 House bill.
B. History: State Law Precedent
As the congressional debate carried on regarding a ban on the D & X
26 1
procedure, thirty state legislatures banned the late term abortion.
Prior to the Stenberg decision, the federal circuits were split as to the
constitutionality of these laws. 26 2 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits held
the bans unconstitutional, while the Seventh and Fourth Circuits held
the laws acceptable. 2 63 The Supreme Court's holding in Stenberg
overruled the Seventh Circuit's decision. 2 64 However, because the
Fourth Circuit had never determined whether the State's partial birth
abortion act was applicable to the defendants in the case, Stenberg

257. H.R. 4965, 107th Cong. (2002).
258. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 4965, 107th Cong. (2002), at http://thomas.loc.gov (noting
that the Senate received the bill, but that no other action was taken).
259. Bill Summary & Status, S. 3, 108th Congress (2003), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
260. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (West Supp. 2003), with H.R. 4965, 107th Cong. (2002).
261. See Walther, supra note 185, at 707 nn.120-21 (listing states that have bans using the
nonmedical phrase "partial-birth abortion" as of 2000). The states listed in Walther's article are
as follows: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Id. Some of these states have since
changed the language of their laws to exclude the phrase "partial-birth." For example, Missouri's
law currently is the Infant's Protection Act, Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.300 (Supp. 2002), Montana's
law is the Control and Practice of Abortion, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1999), and
Vermont does not have a law pertaining to "partial-birth" abortion.
262. Walther, supra note 185, at 708.
263. Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding unconstitutional an Iowa ban on "partial birth abortion"), and Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding unconstitutional an Ohio
ban on the D & X procedure mentioned by name in the statute), with Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 1998) (granting deference to the legislature's
ability to draft a bill that is constitutional and therefore upholding the bill, but noting that the
procedures the doctors in Gilmore provided were not those banned by the law), and Hope Clinic
v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin laws
against partial birth abortions "can be applied in a constitutional manner"), overruled by Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
264. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000), overruling Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195
F.3d 857 (7thCir. 1999)). See generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
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technically did not overrule the Fourth Circuit 265 Post-Stenberg, state
legislative attempts to ban abortion procedures decreased by eighty-four
26 6
percent.
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Ohio ban on partial birth
abortion. 267 This was the first challenge of a state D & X ban since the
PBABA became law. 268 The Sixth Circuit carefully reviewed the
requirements of Roe, Casey, and Stenberg and concluded that the Ohio
statute's health exception, which did not provide explicitly for mental
health, 269 was adequate, 2 70 and the law properly differentiated between
27 1
the D & E and D & X procedures.
C. The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003
1. Text of the Law

The PBABA prohibits any physician from performing a "partial-birth
abortion" while affecting interstate commerce. 2 72 The statute defines a
265. Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332 (stating that the plaintiff doctors had not established that the
banned procedure was the procedure they performed and vacating the injunction against the ban).
266. NARAL & NARAL FOUND., WHO DECIDES?: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF
ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, at x (10th ed. 2001) (noting that in 2000 there were nine
abortion-related bills introduced, as compared to fifty-eight such bills introduced in 1999). See
generally supra Part Il.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
267. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
268. Id.
269. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(B) (2000). But cf Women's Med. Prof I Corp.
v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 1997) (representing the last time the Sixth Circuit
looked at a similar law and found it unconstitutional because the health exception did not contain
an exception for the mental health of the woman seeking the abortion).
270. Taft, 353 F.3d at 449 (noting that the Ohio law permits the procedure when "necessary,
in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the
mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function" (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 1(B)-(C))).
See generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing
the Roe opinion); supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Casey opinion).
271. See Taft, 353 F.3d at 451 (listing the exact steps and sequential order of a doctor's
actions in performing the banned partial birth abortion procedure). See generally supra Part
II.B.3 (explaining the D & X procedure).
272. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206 (listing the prohibition as applying when a physician "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly performs a partial birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus"). The
Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Under the Commerce Clause, the
federal government is permitted to pass laws involving an intercourse among the intermingling
states. See CHEMERINSKY, POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 31 (explaining the definitions
of "Commerce" and "Among the States"). But see David B. Kopel and Glenn H. Reynolds,
Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV.
59, 105-06 (1997) (arguing that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997 is not an appropriate
use of Congress's power to control matters affecting interstate commerce).
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partial birth abortion as a procedure in which a physician intentionally
delivers a living fetus through the cervix until, in a breach position, only
the head remains in the uterus, or, in a head-first presentation, the entire
fetal skull is outside the body of the woman and the physician
subsequently performs some act killing the live fetus. 27 3 The statute

includes an exception for any "partial birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury." 274 Following the statute's

definition of "physician" 275 and the penalties for violating the
PBABA2 7 6 is a section addressing "Congressional Findings.

277

2. Findings of Congress
At the conclusion of the statutory language of the PBABA, Congress
included a section of findings and declarations. 278 The Congressional
Findings section follows statutory language that states that there is a
"moral, medical, and ethical consensus" for prohibiting the late term
abortion procedure at issue. 2 79 The findings section does not explain
the moral or ethical arguments, but it does include multiple paragraphs

273. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a). The statute describes the act prohibited as
occurring when a physician
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the
body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows
will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and... performs the overt act, other than
completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus ....
Id. In the breech position, the fetus's feet will be the first to come through the cervix, and in a
head first position, the head comes through first. ARLENE EISENBERG ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT
WHEN YOU'RE EXPECTING 237-38 (1996).
274. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (emphasis added). The complete language of the
statute states that "It]his subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or
physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself." Id.
275. Id. The PBABA defines "physician" as "a doctor of medicine or osteopathy legally
authorized to practice medicine and surgery by the State in which the doctor performs such
activity, or any other individual legally authorized by the State to perform Abortions." Id.
276. Id. The penalties provided in the state include "money damages for all injuries,
psychological and physical" and "statutory damages equal to three times the cost of the partialbirth abortion." Id.
277. Id.; see also infra Part III.C.2-3 (discussing the findings and declarations of Congress
included in the PBABA).
278. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2.
279. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2-3 (discussing the findings and declarations of Congress
included in the PBABA).
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concerning the medical consensus. 280 In the PBABA, Congress took
note of the Stenberg findings 2 8 1 but commented that extensive
legislative hearings post-Stenberg came to the opposite conclusion: the
28 2
D & X procedure is never necessary to save the life of a woman.
Congress further noted within the Congressional Findings section that
the factual findings that the Supreme Court had been required to adopt
in Stenberg, 2under the deferential standard of review, were
"questionable." 83 Congress then dedicated five paragraphs of the

Congressional Findings section to exploring the highly deferential
standard that the Supreme Court should use in reviewing the legislative

factual findings in the PBABA.284

Congress specifically mentioned

Anderson v. Bessemer City,2 8 5 Katzenbach v. Morgan,28 6 and Turner

280. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2. The only ethics argument the findings section
specifically addresses is the argument that physicians may confuse their ethical duties to
"preserve and promote life" because in a partial birth abortion the doctor "acts directly against the
physical life of a child." Id. § 2(14)(J). While other arguments are not addressed in the section,
abortion opponents assert that abortion is morally wrong because a fetus is a person from the
moment of conception. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion Is Morally Wrong, in THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V. WADE 207 (Louis P. Pojman & Francis J.
Beckwith eds., 1998). Others argue that abortion is immoral because the fetus belongs to the
human species, and thus killing a fetus is the equivalent of a homicide. Philip Devine, The Scope
of the ProhibitionAgainst Killing, in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V.
WADE, supra, at 234, 236.
281. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court drew
upon the findings of the trial court, including testimony and medical texts that the court
examined). The trial court concluded that there are times when the D & X procedure is preferred
by physicians. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1125 (D. Neb. 1998) (stating that "the
D & X procedure has been shown by medical evidence to be the safest procedure used by
mainstream medical professionals like Dr. Carhart in certain circumstances").
282. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(5).
[S]ubstantial evidence presented at the Stenberg trial and overwhelming evidence
presented and compiled at extensive congressional hearings, much of which was
compiled after the district court hearing in Stenberg, and thus not included in the
Stenberg trial record, demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to
preserve the health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman upon whom
the procedure is performed and is outside the standard of medical care.
Id. (emphasis added). But see Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 135 (noting that the
intact D & E procedure, D & X, is preferable because there are fewer instrument passes and
therefore a decreased chance of infection or other complications).
283. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(7) ("Thus, in Stenberg, the United States Supreme
Court was required to accept the very questionable findings issued by the district court
judge ....
").
284. Id. § 2(9)-(13).
285. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (holding that a clearly
erroneous standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its own judgment
for that of the trial court).
286. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (employing a highly deferential
standard of review for congressional findings of fact relating to the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
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that
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC287 in support of the standard
2 88
legislation.
this
evaluating
in
use
to
Court
the
wanted
Congress
Congress discussed the rule of law articulated in Anderson
concerning the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 2 89 At issue in
Anderson was whether the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review to a civil rights claim. 290 The petitioner
applied for a job as a recreation director, and she believed that she was
not hired for the position because she was a woman. 2 9 1 The trial court
held in the petitioner's favor, concluding that based on its findings of
fact, the petitioner was the most qualified candidate. 29 2 The appellate
court held that the trial court's findings were "clearly erroneous" and
reversed the decision based on its own findings of fact. 293 The Supreme
Court held that the appellate court had misapplied the clearly erroneous
standard and that the trial court's determinations were correct. 29 4 The
Supreme Court reviewed the prominent case law on the clearly
erroneous standard of review and concluded that it was highly
deferential to the finder of fact. 295 Ultimately, the Court held that a
reviewing court must accept the trial court's findings of fact unless the
reviewing court has a "firm conviction" that the trial court's findings
were clearly erroneous. 296 The reviewing court must not take on the
task of the trial court even if, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have decided the case differently. 297 Congress emphasized this

287. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]
(indicating that substantial deference be given to predictive judgments of Congress); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II] (using a highly
deferential standard of review in holding that Congress may require cable companies to reserve
channels for local broadcasting).
288. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(6), (9), (11).

289. Id.
290. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 566.
291. Id. at 567.
292. Id. at 570 (stating that the "petitioner was the most qualified candidate, that the
committee had been biased against hiring a woman, and that the committee's explanations for its

choice of [another candidate] were pretextual").
293. Id. at 571.
294. Id. at 580-81.
295. Id. at 573.
296. Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
297. Id. at 573-74 ("If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that
had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." (citing
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949))).
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deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review when it included
Anderson in the findings section of the PBABA.29 8
The next case Congress included in the PBABA's findings section,
Katzenbach, dealt with the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of
1965's prohibition on states imposing a literacy requirement on

voters. 299

The Supreme Court stated that it was Congress'

responsibility to evaluate and weigh the competing interests of
encouraging Spanish speakers to learn English and providing Spanish
speakers access to their fundamental right to vote. 3 00 The Court further

commented that it was not the place of the Supreme Court to review the
conclusions Congress reached regarding these factors. 30 1 Ultimately,
the Court held that the law was constitutional and deferred to
congressional conclusions regarding the purpose of the statute.30 2
Congress mentioned Katzenbach in the findings of the PBABA as an
example of the highly deferential standard
the Court used in reviewing
30 3
other congressional determinations.
The last cases the PBABA cites in the Congressional Findings section
are the two Turner BroadcastingSystems, Inc. v. FCC cases ("Turner 1"
and "Turner i/,). 304
At issue in both Turner cases was the
constitutionality of the "must carry" provision of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and. Competition Act ("Cable Act"), which
298. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(6), 117 Stat. 1201,
1202.
299. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643 (1966). Katzenbach quotes the entire statute
at issue; however, the relevant portion is as follows: "Congress hereby declares that.. . it is
necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of [persons educated in
schools where the primary instruction was not in English] on ability to read, write, understand, or
interpret any matter in the English Language." Id. at 643 n. 1.
300. Id. at 655-56 ("Since Congress undertook to legislate so as to preclude the enforcement
of the state law, and did so in the context of a general appraisal of literacy requirements for
voting.., it was Congress' prerogative to weigh these competing considerations." (footnote
omitted)).
301. Id. at 653.
302. Id. at 657-58.
[T]he congressional choice to limit the relief effected in [the statute] may, for example,
reflect Congress' greater familiarity with the quality of instruction in American-flag
schools, a recognition of the unique historic relationship between the Congress and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, an awareness of the Federal Government's acceptance
of the desirability of the use of Spanish as the language of instruction in
Commonwealth schools, and the fact that Congress has fostered policies encouraging
migration from the Commonwealth to the States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
303. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(9) (noting that under Katzenbach there is a "highly
deferential review of congressional factual findings").
304. Id. § 2(11) (stating that the "Court continued its practice of deferring to congressional
factual findings in reviewing the constitutionality" of the Turner cases).
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required cable companies to carry a certain number of local television

stations. 30 5 Congress enacted the law after it conducted three years of
hearings related to the cable television industry. 30 6 These hearings led
Congress to include the conclusions of the fact-finding process, listing
them in the law itself.30 7 Congress passed the statute to protect the
survival of free local broadcast television. 3° 8 The Court in Turner I
held that the Cable Act was a constitutional restriction on free
speech. 3°9 The Court asserted that courts generally must afford great
deference to the "predictive judgments of Congress." 3 10 In Turner H,
the Court once again afforded great deference to Congress' findings in
upholding the statute.3 1 1 By including the Turner cases in addition to
Anderson and Katzenbach in the Congressional Findings section of the
PBABA, Congress reiterated that congressional fact-finding should be
312
afforded a deferential standard of review.

3. Declarations of Congress
Following the statutory language of the PBABA and congressional
findings from the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses, the
305. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994). This discussion will cite to the facts from the first
Turner case, as the second Turner case discusses only an abbreviated set of facts. See Turner II,
520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (stating that "[a]n outline of the Cable Act, Congress' purposes in
adopting it, and the facts of the case are set out in detail in our first opinion").
306. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 632.
307. Id. According to Turner I, "[t]he conclusions Congress drew from its factfinding process
are recited in the text of the Act itself." Id. Such a statutory construction is similar to the
PBABA, in which Congress also included its legislative findings in the text. See Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act § 2.
308. Turner /, 512 U.S. at 634 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 535(2)(a)(16) (1992)).
309. Id. at 657 ("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the freedom
of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not
restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of
information and ideas.").
310. Id. at 665.
311. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) ("In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute,
'courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.' Our sole
obligation is 'to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence."' (citing Turner 1)). But cf Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (relying on City of Boerne v. Flores in holding that "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution."); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress does not have unlimited power, "and
the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has
exceeded its authority under the Constitution"). See generally infra Part IV.D.2. (contending that
the standard used in Boerne and Dickerson is the appropriate standard of review to apply to the
PBABA).
312. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(11) ("The Court continued its practice of deferring to
congressional factual findings in reviewing the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.").
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PBABA makes fifteen declarations about partial birth abortion
generally. 3 13 The first three declarations concern (a) medical facts
relating to the danger of the procedure, (b) the lack of adequate medical

studies regarding the procedure, and (c) a comment from a "prominent
medical association" that the D & X procedure is outside the bounds of
appropriate medical care. 3 14 The next four declarations explain that
both medical testimony on the bill in Congress and testimony given
during Stenberg agree that the procedure is never necessary to save the
life of a woman and, further, that the procedure borders on
infanticide. 3 15 The next five declarations explain why a ban on partial

313. See id. § 2(14)(A)-(O) (listing each declaration separately).
314. Id. § 2(14)(A)-(C).
(A) Partial-birth abortion poses serious risks to the health of a woman undergoing
the procedure. Those risks include, among other things: An increase in a woman's risk
of suffering from cervical incompetence, a result of cervical dilation making it difficult
or impossible for a woman to successfully carry a subsequent pregnancy to term; an
increased risk of uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embolus, and trauma to the
uterus as a result of converting the child to a footling breech position, a procedure
which, according to a leading obstetrics textbook, 'there are very few, if any,
indications for.., other than for delivery of a second twin'; and a risk of lacerations
and secondary hemorrhaging due to the doctor blindly forcing a sharp instrument into
the case of the unborn child's skull while he or she is lodged in the birth canal, an act
which could result in severe bleeding, brings with it the threat of shock, and could
ultimately result in maternal death.
(B) There is no credible medical evidence that partial-birth abortions are safe or are
safer than other abortion procedures. No controlled studies of partial-birth abortions
have been conducted nor have any comparative studies been conducted to demonstrate
its safety and efficacy compared to other abortion methods. Furthermore, there have
been no articles published in peer-reviewed journals that establish that partial-birth
abortions are superior in any way to established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike
other more commonly used abortion procedures, there are currently no medical schools
that provide instruction on abortions that include the instruction in partial-birth
abortions in their curriculum.
(C) A prominent medical association has concluded that partial-birth abortion is
'not an accepted medical practice', that it has 'never been subject to even a minimal
amount of the normal medical practice development,' that 'the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the procedure in specific circumstances remain unknown,' and that
'there is no consensus among obstetricians about its use'. The association has further
noted that partial-birth abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical experts and the
public, is 'ethically wrong,' and 'is never the only appropriate procedure'.
Id.

315. See id. § 2(D)-(G).
(D) Neither the plaintiff in Stenberg v. Carhart, nor the experts who testified on his
behalf, have identified a single circumstance during which a partial-birth abortion was
necessary to preserve the health of a woman.
(E) The physician credited with developing the partial-birth abortion procedure has
testified that he has never encountered a situation where a partial-birth abortion was
medically necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, thus, is never medically
necessary to preserve the health of a woman.
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birth abortion is consistent with Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.3 16 These declarations defend the statute, noting that the

(F) A ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure will therefore advance the health
interests of pregnant women seeking to terminate a pregnancy.
(G) In light of this overwhelming evidence, Congress and the States have a
compelling interest in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. In addition to promoting
maternal health, such a prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly distinguishes
abortion and infanticide, that preserves the integrity of the medical profession, and
promotes respect for human life.
Id.

316. Id. § 2(H)-(L).
(H) Based upon Roe v. Wade... and Planned Parenthood v. Casey... a
governmental interest in protecting the life of a child during the delivery process arises
by virtue of the fact that during a partial-birth abortion, labor is induced and the birth
process has begun. This distinction was recognized in Roe when the Court noted,
without comment, that the Texas parturition statute, which prohibited one from killing
a child 'in a state of being born and before actual birth,' was not under attack. This
interest becomes compelling as the child emerges from the maternal body. A child that
is completely born is a full, legal person entitled to constitutional protections afforded a
'person' under the United States Constitution. Partial-birth abortions involve the
killing of a child that is in the process, in fact mere inches away from, becoming a
'person'. Thus the government has a heightened interest in protecting the life of the
partially-born child.
(I) This, too, has not gone unnoticed in the medical community, where a prominent
medical association has recognized that partial-birth abortions are 'ethically different
from other destructive abortion techniques because the fetus, normally twenty weeks or
longer in gestation, is killed outside of the womb'. According to this medical
association, the 'partial birth' gives the fetus an autonomy which separates it from the
right of the woman to choose treatments for her own body'.
(J) Partial-birth abortion also confuses the medical, legal, and ethical duties of
physicians to preserve and promote life, as the physician acts directly against the
physical life of a child, whom he or she had just delivered, all but the head, out of the
womb, to end that life. Partial-birth abortion thus appropriates the terminology and
techniques used by obstetricians in the delivery of living children-obstetricians who
preserve and protect the life of the mother and the child-and instead uses those
techniques to end the life of the partially-born child.
(K) Thus, by aborting a child in the manner that purposefully seeks to kill the child
after he or she has begun the process of birth, partial-birth abortion undermines the
public's perception of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process,
and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world, in order to destroy a
partially-born child.
(L) The gruesome and inhumane nature of the partial-birth abortion procedure and
its disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant promotes a complete
disregard for infant human life that can only be countered by a prohibition of the
procedure.
Id. See generally supra Part II.A.2 (stating that the trimester system in Roe took into
consideration the governmental interest in protecting a viable fetus); supra Part ll.A.3 (discussing
the way the Casey opinion modified the trimester system to account for the governmental interest
in post-viability abortion).
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3 17
banned procedure concerns a fetus that is not completely in utero.
The last three declarations discuss fetal pain, describe the procedure as
3 18
inhumane, and conclude that Congress should ban the procedure.

IV.

ANALYSIS

This Part examines the PBABA and argue that it is
unconstitutional. 3 19 This Part first explains why the law does not
properly limit only the D & X procedure. 320 Next, this Part shows that
the PBABA does not provide an adequate exception for the health of the
woman seeking an abortion. 32 1 This Part then demonstrates why the
PBABA is an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion pre-viability because Congress intended the statute to operate
as a stepping stone to overturn Roe v. Wade.3 2 2 Finally, this Part

317. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2. The statute distinguishes between prohibitions
against regulating abortion when the fetus is completely in utero and prohibitions on abortion
procedures used when the fetus is partially outside the womb. Id.
318. Id. § 2(M)-(O).
(M) The vast majority of babies killed during partial-birth abortions are alive until
the end of the procedure. It is a medical fact, however, that unborn infants at this stage
can feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their perception of this pain is
even more intense than that of newborn infants and older children when subjected to
the same stimuli. Thus, during a partial-birth abortion procedure, the child will fully
experience the pain associated with piercing his or her skull and sucking out his or her
brain.
(N) Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to
prohibit it will further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all
vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.
Thus, Congress has a compelling interest in acting-indeed it must act-to prohibit
this inhumane procedure.
(0) For these reasons, Congress finds that partial-birth abortion is never medically
indicated to preserve the health of the mother; is in fact unrecognized as a valid
abortion procedure by the mainstream medical community; poses additionally health
risks to the mother; blurs the line between abortion and infanticide in the killing of a
partially-born child just inches from birth; and confuses the role of the physician in
childbirth and should, therefore, be banned.
Id.
319. See infra Part IV.A-D (arguing that the Supreme Court will find the PBABA an
unconstitutional infringement on a woman's right to choose abortion).
320. See infra Part IV.A. 1 (explaining how the D & E procedure is encompassed in the bill).
See generally supra Part II.B. 1-3 (explaining the various abortion procedures).
321. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the requirements of a proper health exception in abortion
legislation based on prior case law); see also supra Part II.A.3 (describing the health exception
requirements under Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey).
322. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing Congress's findings as based on "moral" reasoning).
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demonstrates that the legislative findings do not adequately avoid a

323
conflict with Stenberg.

A. The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003 Erroneously
Applies to and ProhibitsSafe and Necessary
Pre-viabilityAbortion Procedures
324
The PBABA does not mention any medical procedure by name.

Instead, the law explains an abortion procedure in layman's terms and
prohibits doctors from using this procedure. 325 The problem with this
explanation is that it is vague. 326
The language of the law-

"performing an overt act that [the doctor] knows will kill the partially

delivered living fetus" 32 7-fails
to give doctors an adequate
328
explanation, in medical terms, of what they can and cannot do.
Therefore, due to the vagueness in the PBABA's language, the statute

appears to apply to abortion procedures that courts traditionally have

viewed as constitutional. 329 This will have a chilling effect on abortions
3 30
because doctors will fear prosecution.

1. The Law Could Apply to D & E in Violation of Stenberg
The PBABA could apply to D & E, thereby violating Stenberg's
holding that a ban on pre-viability D & E is an unconstitutional burden
323. See infra Part IV.D (examining the deferential standard used by the Court and arguing
that such a standard will not be a shield against constitutional scrutiny).
324. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531). See generally supra Part III.C (discussing a
procedure the statute calls "partial-birth" abortion). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5
(2003) (using the term "dilation and extraction" as synonymous with "partial birth abortion" and
then defining the steps of the procedure).
325. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a). See generally supra Part III.C (discussing the
adoption of the PBABA without using medical terminology to describe the banned procedure).
326. See Massie, supra note 243, at 332-39 (commenting on the constitutional question of
vagueness and abortion legislation and concluding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
1997 was unconstitutionally vague).
327. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a).
328. See Massie, supra note 243, at 334 (quoting congressional testimony on the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 1997 that stated that "the name [partial-birth abortion] did not exist until
someone who wanted to ban abortions made it up"); see also supra notes 191-92 and
accompanying text (explaining that partial birth abortion is not a medical term).
329. See Melissa C. Holsinger, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: The
Congressional Reaction to Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 603, 609
(2002) (explaining that the "bill easily could have been drafted to exclude D & E by specifically
limiting the prohibition of either D & X or post-viability procedures"); see also Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (holding that an abortion ban that prohibits D & E pre-viability
is unconstitutional).
330. Massie, supra note 243, at 334 ("The bill's vagueness will have a chilling effect on the
availability of abortion services.").
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on a woman's right to choose abortion. 33 1 In a standard D & E, the
doctor disarticulates the fetus in utero, which requires the doctor to
3 32
repeatedly insert tools in the uterus to remove the disarticulated fetus.
After a certain point, which varies for each woman, the doctor must
drain the fetal skull for the skull to pass though the cervix. 3 33 The
procedure for draining the skull and collapsing it is exactly the same as
the procedure that doctors use for D & X, only the fetus is not always
334
intact in a D & E.

To disarticulate the fetus in D & E, the doctor may pull the majority
of the fetus through the cervix, and the fetus may be alive until the
doctor completes the disarticulation. 335 Yet, the PBABA prohibits a

doctor from "performing an overt act that [the doctor] knows will kill
the partially delivered living fetus." 3 36 Therefore, because the doctor
knows that when she pulls the fetus into the cervix it may be alive until
she disarticulates it, the D & E procedure directly violates the language

331.

See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 609 (explaining how the PBABA could apply to
See generally Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930; supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg
holding).
332. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the method doctors use to perform non-intact D & E).
D & E).

333.

Haskell, Surgical Abortion, supra note 171, at 135; see also ACOG Brief, supra note

203, at 5-6 (explaining that the cervix isdilated only to twenty percent so the fetal skull cannot
pass through); supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the medical reasons a doctor must collapse the fetal
skull to pull it through the cervix in both D & E and D & X).
334. Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 135 (explaining the way a doctor collapses
the fetal skull when performing a D & E or an intact D & E (or a D & X)). See generally supra
Part II.B.2 (explaining D & E and D & X).
335. Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 135 ("When cervical dilation is adequate
but not generous, numerous instrument passes may be necessary ....
");
see also supra Part II.B.2
(explaining the disarticulation process in D & E).
336. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531). By performing the exact D & E procedure Congress
insists is not banned, a doctor could violate the PBABA. See infra note 346 and accompanying
text (explaining the rational difficulty in distinguishing between the death dilemma portion of a
D & X and a non-intact D & E).
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of PBABA.3 37 The Stenberg Court made clear that a limitation on
338
D & E is constitutionally impermissible.
Moreover, the PBABA's description of the point at which doctors
face criminal liability does not render the PBABA inapplicable to the
In Stenberg, the Court found the law
D & E procedure. 3 39

unconstitutional partly because of its vague phrase "substantial portion,"
referring to how much of the fetal body had to be outside the woman's
body for the prohibition to take effect. 340 The Attorney General wanted
the "substantial portion" language replaced with "body up to the head,"
but the Court could not find any justification for that narrow
what portion
interpretation. 34 1 In contrast, the PBABA defines exactly
34 2
body.
woman's
the
outside
be
must
body
fetal
of the
Yet, the more descriptive words Congress used did not solve the
critical error of the Nebraska law; the change in language was merely
cosmetic. 34 3 Though the PBABA defines more clearly at what point a
doctor will be criminally liable for her actions, 344 it does not go far

337. See Haskell, Surgical Abortion, supra note 171, at 131 (discussing techniques used to
cause fetal demise); see also ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 12 (noting that "the moment at
which fetal demise occurs is 'extremely variable"' (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1118 (D. Neb. 1998) (quoting the testimony of Dr. Hodgson))). But see Johnson Letter,
supra note 192 (explaining that the PBABA does not apply to D & E because the law applies only
to procedures in which the fetus is not dismembered). However, some D & E procedures do
involve an intact fetus because such a procedure is safer than disarticulating fetus. See supra note
176 and accompanying text (explaining why intact D & E is a safer procedure); see also infra
Part IV.A.2 (explaining why the PBABA can apply to first trimester abortions performed on an
intact fetus).
338. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (holding a Nebraska law unconstitutional
as an undue burden on a woman's right to choose the D & E abortion method); see also supra
Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion and its holding).
339. See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text (arguing that the PBABA proscribes
D & E).
340. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 940 (describing different ways to read "substantial portion"). See
generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
341. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 944-45 (noting that the Court refused to read the language of the
Nebraska bill differently from its literal meaning). See generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the
Stenberg opinion).
342. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A)) ("In the case of a head-first presentation,
the entire fetal head is outside the body of the [woman], or, in the case of breech presentation, any
part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the [woman] .... ).
343. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 939 (commenting that the disarticulation of the fetus occurs when
the fetus meets resistance, and if the resistance is not met until the majority of the fetus is through
the cervix, then the doctor will violate the Nebraska statute though intending to perform a
D & E).
344. See id. at 939 (noting that a "substantial portion" could mean "an arm or leg").
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enough.3 45 The way the law is written, it can apply to many types 346
of
abortion procedures, including those performed in the first trimester.
If Congress did not intend the law to apply to D & E, it could have
written so explicitly in the law. 34 7 Thus, the language of the law34 could
8
apply to D & E in violation of the parameters set out in Stenberg.
2. The Law Could Unintentionally Ban First Trimester
Abortion Procedures

The language of the PBABA also wrongly prohibits first trimester
abortion procedures because the fetus may pass through the cervix

intact in many of these procedures. 349 For instance, in the common
D & C procedure, the fetus will pass through the cervix, albeit through a
cannula, either intact or disarticulated, which will cause fetal death.3 5 °
The PBABA language prohibits "deliberately and intentionally
vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus until... the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation,
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother" to purposefully kill the fetus. 35 1 Therefore, this language
would prohibit D & C because the doctor would perform a procedure
whereby the fetus passed through the cervix intact, through a cannula,
3 52
and the doctor intended to cause fetal death.

345. See Haskel, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 135 (explaining that the procedures for
D & E and D & X are very similar). See generallysupra Part II.B. 1-2 (explaining the exact steps
of the different abortion techniques and noting that in more than one the fetus passes through the
cervix intact).
346. See ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 16.
[T]here is no rational way to distinguish the 'death-causing' portion of a D & X (the
use of an instrument to decompress the fetal skull) from the 'death-causing' portion of
a non-intact D & E (the use of an instrument to disarticulate the fetus or collapse its
skull, as is often necessary in a non-intact D & E).
Id.
347. See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 609 ("Given the drafters' stated intention to exclude
D & E procedures from the bill's scope, one can only speculate why they did not simply exclude
such procedures on the face of the bill.").
348. See supra notes 220, 229 and accompanying text (noting the holding in Stenberg
regarding the fact that it is unconstitutional for a law to proscribe both D & X and D & E).
349. See supra Part II.B. I (explaining that in a D & C the doctor will use suction to remove
the contents of the uterus, possibly intact). The PBABA prohibits a doctor from performing a
procedure whereby the doctor intends to cause the death of an intact fetus partially removed from
the uterus. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A)).
350. See supra Part I1.B. I (explaining the details of the D & C procedure).
351. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a).
352. Id. (prohibiting physicians from bringing a fetus through the vagina for the purpose of
performing an act that the physician knows will cause the fetus to die).
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Moreover, the statute does not explain adequately why it would not

ban

induction, which doctors

sometimes use during the first

trimester. 353 When doctors use the induction procedure, it is possible
for the fetal head to become lodged in the cervix or the umbilical cord
to become tangled. 3 54 When this happens, the majority of the fetal body
may be outside the woman's body, and the doctor must perform actions
that he or she knows will cause the death of a fetus with a still-beating
heart. 355 These actions directly violate the prohibition in the PBABA
356
despite the fact that they are performed during the first trimester.
There is nothing in the Congressional Record to support the notion

that Congress intended to criminalize first trimester abortions or the
labor and induction method.3 5 7 Yet, as in Stenberg, the Court cannot
adopt a narrowed interpretation of a statute that is not supported by the
text of the statute itself. 358 When an offender has committed the
required elements of a prohibited act, he or she will, or at least should
be, prosecuted and convicted. 3 59 Under the PBABA, this means that a
doctor performing a first trimester abortion using the safest procedures
available could be prosecuted. 3 60 The language of the statute renders a

353. See ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 14 n.21 (noting that during this first trimester
procedure, the fetus may be in the vaginal cavity intact); see also supra Part HI.C.1 (discussing
the language of the statute prohibiting a doctor from performing an overt act knowing it will kill
the fetus).
354. Id. (citing Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110 (D. Neb. 1998)) (noting that
separating the fetus from the placenta will cause fetal demise). See generally supra Part II.B.2
(explaining the labor-induction method).
355. Id. See generally supra Part ll.B.2 (explaining the labor-induction method).
356. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (prohibiting physicians from bringing the fetus
through the cervix intact and performing and action that will kill it but failing to mention at what
gestational age the actions are prohibited); see ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 12-13 (explaining
that Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions reaches many safe abortion procedures because the
law refers to a "living unborn fetus," which could include a fetus during the first twelve
gestational weeks); see also supra Part III.C. 1 (discussing the language of the statute prohibiting
a doctor from delivering an intact fetus and performing an overt act intended to kill it).
357. See generally Bill Summary & Status, S. 3, 108th Cong. (2003), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
(providing the complete congressional record for the PBABA).
358. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 944-45 (2000) ("[W]e are without power to adopt a
narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily
apparent." (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988))). See generally supra Part II.B.3
(discussing the Stenberg opinion's explanation of statutory construction).
359. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962) (explaining that a criminal need only
perform each material element of a crime to be convicted of that crime).
360. Cf. ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 16 n.25 (explaining the medical details of how
Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions could be interpreted to include first trimester
procedures); NARAL Brief, supra note 203, at 21 (explaining that "a legislature's failure to
clarify the meaning of 'partial birth' abortion indicates the legislature's intent to prohibit more
than one procedure"). See generally supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (describing
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physician criminally liable if she simply brings the fetus through the
cervix intact and alive and then performs an act that will kill it.3 6 1 This
is exactly what is done in vacuum aspiration abortions during the first
trimester, where the doctor removes the contents of the uterus using a
suction. 36 2 Therefore, the PBABA could prohibit abortion techniques
363
used in the first trimester.
B. The PBABA Does Not Adequately Provide an Exception for the
364
Life and Health of the Woman
The PBABA does not provide an exception for the life and health of
the woman seeking abortion as Casey requires. 365 The exception

provision in the PBABA allows for partial birth abortions only where
366
the life of the woman is in danger if she cannot get such an abortion.
The exception in the Act is not sufficient because the alternatives are
not safer procedures, 367 medical decisions should be left to doctors and
not legislators, 36 8 and appropriate health exceptions must take into
36 9
consideration the mental health of the woman seeking the abortion.

abortion by induction, the elements of which could satisfy the prohibition in the PBABA because
the doctor induces labor with the intent to abort the fetus).
361. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (stating that "the term 'partial-birth abortion'
means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion.., deliberately and intentionally
vaginally delivers a living fetus.. . for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus"); see also supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the
language of the statute).
362. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the methods of first trimester abortions including
bringing the fetus through the cervix intact in a vacuum aspiration procedure).
363. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (prohibiting doctors from bringing the fetus
through the vagina for the purpose of performing an act the doctor knows will kill the fetus); see
also supra note 346 and accompanying text (explaining that under the statutory language D & E
and D & X are indistinguishable).
364. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (stating that "prohibitions [on
abortion] are permitted provided the life or health of the [woman] is not at stake").
365. Id. at 879 (stating that at the point in fetal development where legislatures may regulate
abortion, their legislation must include an exception for the "life or health" of a woman seeking
an abortion).
366. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (stating that the law "does not apply to a partialbirth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury").
367. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (explaining the risks of alternative procedures).
368. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining that legislators are not equipped to write laws that will
affect doctors' decision-making processes).
369. See infra Part IV.B.3 (explaining the necessity for a mental health exception when
prohibiting an abortion procedure).
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1. Alternatives Are Not Safer Procedures

Women

seeking

abortions may undergo

abortions

involving

procedures other than the D & X procedure prohibited by the PBABA,
but these alternatives offer a greater risk of infection or injury to the

woman. 370 For example, hysterotomy offers an alternative late term
abortion procedure, however, a hysterotomy is a pre-term caesarian
section. 371 Because a hysterotomy is a surgical procedure, it includes
many risks such as infection and even death.37 2 Some doctors also use
the induction method of abortion as an alternative. 373 The doctor injects
fetocidal medication causing fetal death and administers medication to
induce labor. 374 Complications from induction can include damage to
the uterus or cervix, bleeding, and infection. 375 An additional risk
associated with induction is that the doctor could accidentally inject the
woman with the drug intended to cause fetal demise, which can lead to
376
convulsions, coma, and even death.

370. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 34 (commenting that other procedures, such
as hysterotomy, should not be used in contemporary abortion practice because of high morbidity
and mortality rates); see also Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1109 (D. Neb. 1998)
(citing the American Medical Association report stating that "maternal mortality and morbidity
associated with [hysterectomy and hysterotomy] are significantly greater than those associated
with other procedures used to induce abortion"); Amy M. Autry et al., A Comparison of Medical
Induction and Dilation and Evacuationfor Second-trimester Abortion, AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY, Aug. 2002, at 393 (concluding that D & E is the safest method of secondtrimester abortion).
371. Walther, supra note 185, at 701.
372. See E. Steve Lichtenberg et al., Abortion Complications Prevention and Management
(providing a graph on mortality rates for hysterotomy as compared with other types of abortion
that shows a 51% hysterotomy mortality rate compared to a 3.7% mortality rate for D & E
procedures, including the intact procedure, after thirteen weeks gestation), in A CLINICIANS
GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 197, 198; see also supra notes
184-86 and accompanying text (describing hysterotomies). Additionally, the National Right to
Life Committee recognized that hysterotomy offers the highest risk to the physical health of the
woman seeking the abortion because of the potential for uterine rupture in subsequent
pregnancies.
NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., ABORTION: SOME MEDICAL FACTS, at
http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmfl 1.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
373. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 139 (explaining the labor-induction method of
abortion); see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (describing the induction
procedure).
374. Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 144.
375. See id. at 142-43 (explaining the dangerous effects of the labor and induction method);
see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (describing the induction procedure and
noting its dangers).
376. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 144 (commenting that "[p]roper needle
placement... can be difficult" and noting the risks of hemorrhaging and blood clots associated
with induction); Lichtenberg, supra note 372, at 198 (explaining risks of hysterotomy, in
particular with the use of hypertonic saline).
See generally supra notes 180-83 and
accompanying text (describing the labor-induction procedure and noting its dangers).
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Another alternative to the specific procedure prohibited by the
PBABA is to inject the fetus with fetocidal medication to kill it before
completing the D & X procedure. 3 77 This would ensure that the fetus is
dead at the time of the procedure and, thus, would prevent prosecution
under the PBABA. 37 8 Usually fetal demise occurs when the woman
initially is dilated, a day before the D & E or D & X procedure actually
takes place. 379 However, to ensure the death of the fetus before the
intracranial fluid is drained, a doctor would have to inject the fetus by
passing a needle through the abdomen of the woman. 380 Doctors do not

prefer extra needle injections if they can perform safe procedures
without them. 3 8 1 In the end, guaranteeing fetal demise before any
382
abortion procedure would add an extra health risk to the woman.
The new law puts doctors in a precarious position. 3 83 To comply
with the new law, a doctor would have to ensure fetal demise prior to
the abortion using either hysterotomy or induction, or injecting fetocidal
medication into the fetus. 384 Doing so would violate medical ethics
guidelines for performing procedures using the safest method.38 5 Thus,
377. Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 144.
378. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (requiring a "living" fetus at the start of the procedure to satisfy the elements of the
crime).
379. See Haskell, SurgicalAbortion, supra note 171, at 128 (describing the use and effect of
osmotic dilators). While some doctors claim that the use of osmotic dilators can cause cervical
incompetence, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology disagrees. See Amicus Brief
for the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2223, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 94-830) (stating that "[the threat of cervical
incompetence is related to the amount of cervical dilation. Cervical incompetence consequent to
intact D&X may make it difficult or impossible for a woman to successfully carry a subsequent
pregnancy to term"), available at 2000 WL 228448. But see ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 23
(explaining that a general D & E requires the same amount of cervical dilation, often over a few
day period, and childbirth involves greater dilation than the D & X procedure). Further, the
repeated use of sharp instruments required by the nonintact D & E poses a greater risk to the
woman's health than the intact D & X which uses only one sharp instrument pass. Id. at 24.
380. Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 144 (describing the difficulty of accurate needle
placement).
381. Interview with Allison A. Cowett, MD, Northwestern University Feinberg School of
Medicine, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, in Chicago, Ill. (Dec. 22, 2003).
382. Blumenthal et al., supra note 180, at 144 (discussing concerns about appropriate needle
placement so as not to harm the woman in the process of causing fetal demise).
383. See infra notes 384-86 and accompanying text (explaining that in order for a doctor to
comply with the new law while performing an intact D & E, the doctor would have to inject the
fetus with fetocidal medication, which is contrary to medical ethical guidelines requiring the
doctor to use safest possible procedure).
384. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, §3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (noting that the prohibition is only for performing abortions on living fetuses).
385. See Charlotte Ellerston & Carolyn Westhoff, ProcedureSelection (explaining the role of
a medical counselor in helping a woman decide which procedure is best for her, including
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at a
forcing doctors to comply with the PBABA would put patients
386
licenses.
their
losing
of
risk
at
greater health risk and put doctors
2.

Taking Choice Away from Doctors Is Not Good Medical Policy

The PBABA improperly intrudes into medical decisions best made
The medical
by doctors, which endangers women's health. 387
doctors and
of
through
licensing
regulated
has
long
been
profession
388
Even with governmental
credentialing of medical facilities.

regulations in place to ensure the quality of medicine, "the law has not
heretofore

attempted

to tell qualified

physicians

what

surgical

procedures they may or may not engage in for the purpose of achieving

valid medical objectives (in this case, abortions). ' 389 At the time that
Congress passed the PBABA, the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League ("NARAL") planned to air television
advertisements decrying "the first federal ban on safe medical
' 390
procedures" and stating, "Who knows what they will do next?
time that
Other groups have also noted that this law represents the 39first
1
Congress has ever outlawed a specific medical procedure.
Outlawing a specific medical procedure is dangerous for many

reasons; for instance, it may interfere with a physician's best judgment
and intrude into private medical decisions. 392 While the PBABA
creates an exception, allowing partial birth abortion when necessary to
consideration of personal preferences and the medical opinion of the doctor and noting that the
counselor helps determine the safest possible procedure for a woman), in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE
TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 63, 63.

386. See ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 30 (stating that "[e]ven physicians who act in good
faith in a medical emergency risk imprisonment and loss of license if their decisions are later
second-guessed"); see also Martin B. Flamm, Medical Malpractice and the PhysicianDefendant,

in S. SANDY SANBAR ET AL., LEGAL MEDICINE 123 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that physicians must
adhere to a certain standard of medical care and diligence in treating their patients).
387. See infra note 392 and accompanying text (explaining that taking medical decisions away
from doctors is dangerous to a woman's health).
388. See Massie, supra note 243, at 372 (noting that although doctors have long been
regulated through licensing and disciplinary procedures, the regulations never specified what
surgical procedures doctors may or may not perform); see, e.g., Barry R. Furrow et al., The Rise
of Hospital Corporate Liability 927 (2001) (explaining procedures in place to ensure quality aid
in hospitals).
389. Massie, supra note 243, at 372; see also Hutcheson, supra note 235 (quoting President
Bush as saying that the "right to life cannot be granted or denied by government, because it does
not come from government-it comes from the creator of life").
390. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The War over Abortion Moves to a Smaller Stage, N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 26, 2003, at D4, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
391. Feldt, supra note 2, at 86-87.
392. Id. at 87 (arguing that if Congress passes a late term abortion ban, it "would endanger
women's health, overrule the best judgment of physicians, and set a dangerous precedent for
government intrusion into private medical decisions").
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save the life of the woman seeking the abortion, 393 Congress failed to
consider adequately other medical reasons regarding why a woman may
need this procedure. 394 For example, there are circumstances when the
D & X procedure is preferable so that a woman may safely have
children in the future. 395
A woman may survive any abortion

procedure, making D & X unnecessary to save her life, but D & X may
preserve her ability to have children in the future. 396 The PBABA
prevents doctors from performing a D & X abortion where the doctor
chooses that procedure to ensure that a woman will be able to have
397
successful pregnancies in the future.
Further, the PBABA speaks to doctors in legislative terms rather than
medical terms. 3 98 Legislators should not step into the shoes of

doctors. 399 Laws pertaining to medical practice must be written so that
doctors know from a practical standpoint the prohibitions around which
400
they are working.

393. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a)) (stating that a doctor may perform the otherwise
prohibited procedure if it is necessary to save a woman's life).
394. See Feldt, supra note 2, at 86 (describing the conditions of two women who were
carrying fetuses that could not sustain life outside the womb); see also infra notes 402-03 and
accompanying text (explaining the reasons why the Supreme Court required a "health" exception
and not just a "life" exception).
395. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (telling Mary-Dorothy Line's story about
how she was able to have children because she and her doctor chose to use the D & X procedure
on her fetus, which could not have sustained life outside the womb).
396. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (explaining that two women in particular
were able to carry successful pregnancies because they chose to terminate prior pregnancies using
D & X). But see Nancy Romer et al., PartialBirth Abortion Is Bad Medicine, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 1996, at A22, available at 1996 WL-WSJ 11799005, wherein five doctors who are founding
members of the Physicians' Ad Hoc Coalition for Truth state, "Contrary to what abortion activists
would have us believe, partial-birth abortion is never medically indicated to protect a woman's
health or her fertility. In fact, the opposite is true: The procedure can pose a significant and
immediate threat to both the pregnant woman's health and her fertility." However, according the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, "no reliable medical evidence supports the
claims. . . that D & X endangers maternal health." ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at 23.
397. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (noting that the only exception allowing a
partial birth abortion is to save the woman's life).
398. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text (explaining that partial birth abortion is
not a medical term).
399. See Feldt, supra note 2, at 87 ("I am still amazed by those who would look into the eyes
of a woman in crisis and say, 'We're not doctors and we're not your family, but we'll decide what
you can or cannot do."'); cf IMBER, supra note 169, at xiii (commenting on a physician's
inability to discuss the major elements of foundational abortion cases and stating that "[t]he
practice of medicine was not a series of intellectual debates about ethics and law but a way of
acting with patients, colleagues, and, importantly, family").
400. See Lichtenberg et al., supra note 372, at 231 (stating that "legislators and courts must
ensure that abortion restrictions are clear so individual practitioners know their responsibilities to
their patients and to the governmental authorities regulating their health practice").
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To Provide Adequately for the Health of the Woman, the Law

Must Account for Mental Health Concerns
The PBABA improperly failed to account for the mental health of
women seeking abortions, as precedent requires. 40 1 The Supreme Court
in Roe clearly emphasized that abortion law should consider the
psychological harm that prohibiting abortions could cause.40 2 The
Supreme Court stated in Roe, and reaffirmed in Casey, that at the point
in fetal development where legislatures may regulate abortion, their

legislation must include an exception "to preserve the life or health" of
the woman seeking an abortion. 40 3 The Court in Danforth relied on
Roe's holding that any regulation on abortion must take into account the
health of the woman. 4° 4 In Danforth, the Court did not defer to
legislative findings that the banned procedure was "deleterious" to the
woman's health.40 5 Likewise, Stenberg focused on the health of the
woman as its "paramount concern." 4 06 Therefore, Supreme Court

401. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 3(a) (stating that the only time a doctor may use the
D & X procedure is when the woman's life is at risk due to "physical disorder, physical illness, or
physical injury").
402. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by childcare."); see also supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the
mental health component mentioned in Roe v. Wade).
403. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting
the language used in Roe); see Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1145 (discussing the ramifications of
life or health requirements in abortion regulation cases).
404. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.. 52, 76 (1976) (discussing the Court's
questions regarding whether the law "reasonably relates" to the health of the woman seeking the
abortion); see also supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Danforth
decision); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the decision in Roe v. Wade, including mental health
components).
405. PlannedParenthood,428 U.S. at 76-79; see also supra notes 121-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the Danforth holding, which was contrary to the legislative findings). The Sixth
Circuit required a mental health exception for abortion bans in Women's Medical Professional
Corp. v. Voinovich. Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 207 (6th Cir.
1997). There the Sixth Circuit held that a health exception under Roe and Doe required both
physical and mental health components. Id.; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text
(discussing the requirements for abortion legislation under Roe and Doe). Recently, however, in
Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft, the Sixth Circuit narrowed its opinion on mental
health exceptions, requiring a "partial birth" abortion ban to provide an exception for "health"
and not specifically "mental health." Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 449-50
(6th Cir. 2003). The court upheld an Ohio statute banning the D & X procedure. Id. at 453. The
Sixth Circuit commented that its previous mental health holding was limited to "serious," "nontemporary," "severe," and "irreversible" threats and that the new Ohio law satisfied the
requirements of Casey and Stenberg. Id. at 449; see supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg
Court's requirement that a ban on a abortion procedure must contain an exception for the life and
health of the woman).
406. Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1138; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931
(2000) (stating that "this Court has made clear that a State may promote but not endanger a
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precedent makes clear that a health exception, in addition to an
exception for the life of the woman, is a 40necessary
requirement for a
7
valid prohibition on an abortion procedure.
In selecting an abortion procedure, doctors take into consideration the
difficult emotional process the woman is going through in addition to
her physical medical needs. 40 8 According to the leading textbook on
abortion, holding the fetus after abortion can be an important step in the
grieving process, particularly when the doctor performed an abortion on
a fetus that could not have sustained life outside the womb. 40 9 It is only
by using the intact D & X procedure that the woman could have this
4 10
important moment to grieve.
Moreover, even many of those who argue that no health exception is
necessary in a ban on an abortion procedure agree that a health
exception is proper in the case of rape or incest. 411 The Casey Court

woman's health when it regulates the methods of abortion"). See generally supra Part I!.B.3
(discussing the Stenberg decision).
407. See supra notes 402-06 and accompanying text (laying out the Supreme Court precedent
for a health exception); infra note 409 and accompanying text (noting that the leading textbook
on abortion provides an important mental health rationale for using D & X). But see CTR.FOR
HEALTH & ENV'T, KANSAS DEP'T OF HEALTH & ENV'T, ABORTIONS IN KANSAS 1999,
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 11 (1999) (showing that all of the 182 "partial-birth" abortions
performed in the State of Kansas were performed on viable fetuses for reasons pertaining to the
substantial and irreversible mental impairment of a major bodily function), available at
http://www.kdhe.state.ks.us/hci/99itopl.pdf. (last visited June 17, 2004).
However, it is
important to note that the study asked different questions for the partial birth abortion section than
it did of any other abortion procedure in the study. See id. at 10.
408. See Haskell, Surgical Abortion, supra note 171, at 125 (explaining the factors that
influence doctors to prefer one method of abortion over another).
409. See id. ("Grieving is important for the parents of an anomalous fetus, and seeing and
holding the fetus are important components of healing. Their needs may be better met with an
intact fetus ....
").
410. Id.; cf Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1149 ("Courts commit a grave disservice to women
when they put politics before maternal health. Courts also commit a grave disservice to the
Constitution and preceding case law, especially Roe and Casey, when they deny women the
freedom to have an abortion for health reasons.").
411. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Politicaland Moral Battle over Late-term
Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 430 n.165 (1998) (commenting that "there is a
prevailing and documented sense that women who are pregnant because of unwanted sexual
encounters (rape and incest) should be allowed access to abortion"); see also Richard Collin
Mangrum, Stenberg v. Carhart: Poor Interpretivist Analysis, Unreliable Expert Testimony, and
The Immorality of the Court's Invalidation of Partial-BirthAbortion Legislation, 34 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 549, 603 (2001) (stating that in the case of rape, abortion might be acceptable, but
suggesting that the woman should still have the procedure performed prior to the time when only
a late term procedure may be used); LaShunda R. Rowe, Note, An Inside Look at PartialBirth
Abortion, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 327, 340 (1999).
Georgia law proscribed an abortion except as performed by a duly licensed Georgia
physician when necessary in 'his best clinical judgment' because continued pregnancy
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commented that no matter what the result of the philosophical debate on
abortion procedures, victims of rape or incest must be given access to
abortions, despite their physical ability to carry the pregnancy to
term. 4 12 Also, the World Health Organization asserts that women who
become pregnant as a result of rape need special medical and
psychological care. 4 13 The PBABA does not include any exception for
4 14
victims of rape or incest.
Accordingly, a statute that prohibits a particular abortion procedure

must include an exception for both the life and health, including mental
health, of the woman seeking the abortion. 4 15 When a woman has made
the very difficult decision to get an abortion, legislators should not force
her to change her mind because they think she has made the wrong

choice. 416 The Due Process Clause provides a liberty interest for a
woman's right to choose abortion. 4 17 If the Due Process Clause is to
maintain any significance, then the legislative branch cannot gloss over

would endanger a pregnant woman's life or injure her health; the fetus would likely be
born with a serious defect; or the pregnancy resulted from rape.
Rowe, supra, at 340.
412. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992).
[U]nderlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic
questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except
perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her
own life or health, or is the result of rape.
Id. See generally supra notes 139-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Casey decision).
413. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 68 (stating that the standards used in rape
cases "should ideally also be part of comprehensive norms and standards for the overall
management of survivors of rape, covering physical and psychological care"); see also Carol J.
Rowland Hogue et al., Answering Questions About Long-term Outcomes (explaining the
difficulties of abortion in the case of rape or incest), in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND
SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 217, 224. In describing the difficult question of whether
to abort a fetus conceived through rape, the author states, "If the woman destroys the embryo, she
destroys part of herself. If she protects the embryo, she nurtures part of her attacker. The
experience of carrying the pregnancy or abortion is likely to be psychologically difficult in these
circumstances." Id.
414. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C § 153 1(a)) (providing an exception only for abortions necessary
to save the life of the woman seeking an abortion).
415. See Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1144 ("In sum, courts should interpret the meaning of
'health' broadly to encompass verifiable mental, emotional, and physical health risks, including
pre-existing risks and risks arising out of the pregnancy.").
416. Casey, 505 U.S. at 919 (discussing mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting periods before
abortions and stating, "A woman who has, in the privacy of her thoughts and conscience, weighed
the options and made her decision cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because the State
believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.").
417. Hodgson v.. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990); see supra notes 130-37 and
accompanying text (discussing Hodgson and a woman's liberty interest in abortion).
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the liberty interest in abortion. 4 18 The liberty interest in abortion cannot
be severed from the health exception because the case law is clear: a

woman has the right to choose abortion, and protecting a woman's
health requires far more than an exception to save her life.4 19
C. The PBABA Is an Undue Burden on a Woman Seeking a
Pre-viabilityAbortion and Constitutes the First
Step in an Attempt To Overrule Roe v. Wade
There is an old joke that governmental interest in children begins at
conception and ends at birth.4 2 ° President Bush exemplified that
statement when during election debates he stated, "We need to ban
partial birth abortions... [doing so] would be a positive step toward
reducing the number of abortions in America." 4 21 However, seeking to
reduce the number of abortions by banning them is exactly the
definition of an undue burden that the Court adopted in Casey.42 2 The
Casey opinion unequivocally explains that to further the State's interest
in potential life, the State must "inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it."4 23 Simply prohibiting an abortion procedure does not
"inform" the woman but rather hinders her choice by forcing her to use

418. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (arguing that if a woman is not permitted
to choose abortion, than the Due Process Clause will become a "nullity").
419. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 936-37 (2000) (noting that the health of the woman is
of paramount importance in abortion regulation); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (requiring abortion
prohibitions to include an exception for the life or health of the woman seeking abortion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing the psychological ramifications of limiting a
woman's right to seek abortion);.
420. See Bonnie Erbe, Editorial, Late-term Abortion Language on Women's Health Would
Prevent Veto, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 28, 1997, at II B (quoting the joke and
stating, "Truer words were never spoken. If they cared about taking care of babies and protecting
the helpless, they would not be so driven to cut government programs that help the poor, nor
obsessively focused on tax cuts."), available at 1997 WL 6586804; Don Feder, In Abortion
Debate, Who Caresfor Kids?, Editorial, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 12, 1992, at 39 ("These right-tolifers care exclusively for children in gestation. Where is their concern for them after birth? U.S.
Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., another terribly witty liberal, used to say that for anti-abortion
forces life begins at conception and ends at birth."), availableat 1992 WL 4050897.
421. Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1089; see also Ann Devroy, Late-term Abortion Ban
Vetoed; 'Small but Vulnerable' Group of Women Needs Procedure, Clinton Says, WASH. POST,
Apr. I1, 1996, at Al, (explaining that when President Clinton vetoed a bill virtually identical to
the PBABA in 1996, he was surrounded by five women whose lives had been saved because they
had access to the late term abortion procedure), available at 1996 WL 3073599. In contrast,
when President Bush signed the bill into law he was surrounded by six male lawmakers.
Hutcheson, supra note 235.
422. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.").
423. Id.
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a less safe procedure. 4 24 Thus, a statute designed to encourage a
woman to carry a fetus to term would be constitutional so long as it did
not create an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion

generally

425

A further example of the congressional interest in taking steps

towards banning abortion is the attempt to attach an amendment to the
PBABA asserting an intention to uphold Roe v. Wade.4 26 However,
Congress did not pass this amendment or subsequent legislative
attempts to include a similar statement, which could leave many
constituents to deduce that Congress will seek to overrule Roe v.
Wade.4 2 7 Congress dedicated nearly half of the PBABA's legislative
findings section to reasons that a court should uphold the PBABA,
4 28
rather than to reasons that the law is actually good legislative policy.
The first finding mentions that the procedure is "gruesome," but in
Casey, the Court warned against making decisions based on whether a
4 29
judge, or in this case a legislator, finds the procedure objectionable.
Furthermore, whether legislators find an abortion procedure gruesome

should not be the deciding factor in banning 430
it and disregarding a
woman's fundamental liberty interest in abortion.

424. Id. ("Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted .... "); see Massie, supra note 243, at 345-46 (explaining that regulations
to encourage live birth are permissible so long as they are not an undue burden).
425. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and measures
designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be
an undue burden on the right [to abortion].
Id.
426. Bill Summary & Status, S.Amdt.260, 108th Cong. (2003), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
427. See 143 CONG. REC. 64, S4614-15 (daily ed. May 15, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle)
(proposing an amendment in the 105th Congress' Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act requesting that
Roe v. Wade be reaffirmed in the text of the law). See generally supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the
Roe opinion and the fact that it affirmed the fundamental right to abortion).
428. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(3)-(13), 117 Stat.
1201, 1201-03 (listing justifications for why a court should defer to the congressional findings in
the PBABA); see also supra Part Ili.C.2 (discussing the findings section included in the statute).
429. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (noting that personal preferences should not carry any weight
in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute); supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the findings
included in the statute, which describe D & X as gruesome). See generally supra Part II.A.3
(discussing the Casey opinion generally).
430. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Although much ink is spilled today describing the gruesome nature of late-term
abortion procedures, that rhetoric does not provide me a reason to believe that the
procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more brutal, more gruesome, or less
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President Bush sought to reduce the number of abortions in America
by enacting the PBABA. 4 3 1 Yet, doctors have used the procedure
restricted by the PBABA in only .17% of all abortions, approximately
2200 per year,4 32 often when a fetus could not sustain life outside the
womb.4 3 3 In her concurrence in Stenberg, Justice Ginsburg warned
against passing legislation for the purpose of getting a foot in the door
to overruling the fundamental right to abortion. 4 34 The legitimate goal
of reducing the number of abortions in this country should not be
brought about by banning an abortion procedure that can and has saved
the lives of women. 435 Rather, Congress may encourage women to

may not interfere with a woman's right to
carry pregnancies to term but
4 36
choose to have an abortion.

D. Congress' FindingsCannot Shield the PBABA from an Appropriate
ConstitutionalAnalysis
The PBABA contains a series of findings that its drafters concluded
solved the problem of meeting the Stenberg requirements for a valid ban
on an abortion procedure. 437 Congress relied on the findings and
testimony heard during prior attempts to pass a late term abortion ban to
respectful of "potential life" than the equally gruesome procedure Nebraska claims it
still allows.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring); see also David M. Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated
Rights Jurisprudence:An Essay in Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
815, 827 (2001) (discussing Justice Stevens's comments on the "gruesome" abortion procedure);
Richard Stith, Location and Life: How Stenberg v. Carhart Undercut Roe v. Wade, 9 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 255, 256 (2003) (explaining Justices Stevens's and Ginsburg's reasoning
in Stenberg that D & X is no more gruesome than any other abortion procedure and so should not
be banned on that premise).
431. See supra note 421 and accompanying text (asserting that President Bush simply wanted
to reduce the number of abortions performed and that banning partial birth abortion would help
reduce the number of abortions performed in America).
432. See Mary Ellen Schneider, Bush Signs Partial-BirthAbortion Ban, OB. GYN. NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2003, at 1 (discussing abortion statistics collected by the Guttmacher Institute).
433. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting that the use of D & X is often for
hydrocephalus, a condition whereby the fetus cannot sustain life outside the womb).
434. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952 (quoting Judge Posner, who postulated that these types of
laws are passed to "chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v. Wade"); see also supra
Part II.B.4 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Stenberg).
435. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing the stories of women who used
D & X). But see Lori Brannigan Kelly, Selective Abortion Is Immoral (arguing that aborting a
fetus because it does not conform to an ideal is immoral), in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY,
supra note 2, at 20, 24; Robert R. Reilly, Abortion Is Immoral (equating abortion with Nazi
Germany), in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY, supra note 2, at 17, 17-19.
436. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
437. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(3), 117 Stat. 1201,
1201 (noting the Court's holding in Stenberg concerning the vagueness of the procedure banned
in the Nebraska statute and the lack of a health exception in the statute).
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write the findings included in the PBABA.4 3 8 In fact, both the Congress
that enacted the PBABA and the Supreme Court in Stenberg relied 4on
39
the same testimony regarding previous partial birth abortion bills.
Even in relying on the same testimony, some legislators may come out
on opposite sides of the argument, 4 40 but when the debate pertains to
441
health, courts should give deference to doctors, not legislators.
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court gives deference to the legislative
findings of the PBABA, the PBABA still2fails the constitutional test that
44
Justice O'Connor set forth in Stenberg.

1. Congress Erroneously Concluded in the PBABA's Findings
Section That a Deferential Standard of Review Is

Appropriate for the PBABA
In the same way that reviewing courts defer to trial courts' findings
of fact,44 3 courts also defer to legislative fact finding. 44 4 Generally,
438. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-58, at 12-13 (2003) (citing to testimony taken during the 104th
Congress' hearings on partial birth abortion).
439. See id. (citing to testimony taken during the congressional hearings on partial birth
abortion); see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929 (commenting on testimony given in the 105th
Congress).
440. E.g., Bill Summary & Status, 108th Cong. (2003), at http://thomas.loc.gov (noting that
the roll call votes for each term are not unanimous). Compare ACOG Brief, supra note 203, at
20 (noting that D & X is within the proper standard of medical care for some patients), with Brief
of Amici Curiae of Association of American Physicians and Surgeons et al. at 17, Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (noting that D & X is outside the proper standard of
care for patients), available at 2000 WL 228448.
441. See Schneider, supra note 432, at I (noting that legislators drafted the PBABA in a way
that doctors who provide abortions cannot readily apply because it is not written in medical
terminology); see Kathryn Kolber et al., Legal Issues Related to Abortion in the United States
(discussing the importance of legislators and doctors working together on abortion laws to ensure
that "abortion restrictions are clear so individual practitioners know their responsibilities to their
patients and to the governmental authorities regulating their health practice"), in A CLINICIAN'S
GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 84, at 231, 231.
442. See infra Part IV.D.3 (examining Justice O'Connor's requirements for a constitutional
ban on an abortion procedure).
443. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856
(1982). In judicial matters, a reviewing court must defer to the findings of the trier of fact;
reviewing courts must use the "clearly erroneous" standard of deferential review when analyzing
the facts presented initially to the trial court. Inwood Lab., 456 U.S. at 856. Moreover, the
reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it would have decided the case
another way. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) ("The reviewing court
oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower
court."). Thus, in Stenberg, the Court deferred to the trial court's findings of fact. Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 936-37 (2000) (discussing the district court findings and evidence in the
record supporting a health exception requirement). See generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing
the Stenberg opinion). While the Supreme Court also read thirty-six amicus briefs and heard oral
argument, ultimately it reached the same conclusion as the trial court. See generally Stenberg,
530 U.S at 946 (affirming the decision of the appellate court); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d
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courts defer to congressional findings because, in evaluating and writing
legislation, Congress is the finder of fact. 44 5 The PBABA explicitly
details the deferential standard that courts should use when reviewing
congressional findings. 44 6 The PBABA explains that in Katzenbach v.
Morgan and Turner Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court was
highly deferential to congressional findings. 447
However, if the
Supreme Court reviews the PBABA, it should not employ the
deferential standards used in these cases because the cases are

distinguishable.448
In Katzenbach the Court noted that voting was a fundamental right
and that congressional findings that sought to expand the right to vote to
more citizens were permissible. 44 9 However, the Court commented that
when a law denies (rather than expands) a fundamental right, that law is
subject to the strictest scrutiny. 450 While Katzenbach involved an
1142, 1152 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the decision of the trial court); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F.
Supp. 507, 531 (D. Neb. 1997) (granting the petitioner's request for an injunction against
enforcement of Nebraska's late term abortion law); Transcript of Oral Arguments, Stenberg (No.
99-830), available at 2000 WL 486737.
444. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (stating that judging the
constitutionality of an act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called upon to perform"). The Court went on to say that "the fact that th[e] Court is not
exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath
to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government" compels
it to be "particularly careful not to substitute [its] judgment of what is desirable for that of
Congress, or [its] own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch." Id. at 68; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (employing a high
degree of deference to congressional findings of fact).
445. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (stating that "Congress is far better equipped than the
judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon an issue").
446. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(9), 117 Stat. 1201,
1202 (discussing the deferential standard of review the Supreme Court used in Katzenbach); see
supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Congressional Findings section included in the PBABA).
447. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(9); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
657 (explaining the Court's reasoning in holding the Voting Rights Act constitutional); James
Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May Affect the Antidiscrimination Mandate of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 115 (2000)
(stating that in Katzenbach, the Court "took a decidedly deferential view of Congress' powers").
See generally supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Congressional Findings section of the PBABA).
448. See generally Holsinger, supra note 329, at 612-14 (distinguishing the deferential
standard used in the cases Congress mentioned, such as Turner I and Turner II from others that
the Supreme Court could use, such as City of Boerne v. Flores).
449. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 646; see also Holsinger, supra note 329, at 611 (explaining that
the deference that the Supreme Court should give to the findings of the PBABA is distinguishable
from the deference the Supreme Court gave in Katzenbach).
450. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 657 (stating that when evaluating the Voting Rights Act,
"the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental
rights... is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a
limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the
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attempt to enforce and expand a constitutional right, the PBABA is an
attempt to limit a constitutional right.4 5 1 Therefore, although Congress
included Katzenbach in the PBABA's findings section, Katzenbach's
deferential standard is inapplicable to the PBABA.4 52
Likewise, in the PBABA's findings section, Congress included a
discussion of the deferential standard used in Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC.4 53 In Turner Broadcasting,4 54 the Court applied a
highly deferential standard to the findings of Congress regarding the
continuity of local broadcast television. 4 55 However, like Katzenbach,
these legislative findings differ from the PBABA because they were not
written in response to a previous Supreme Court decision. 456 Thus,
although the PBABA mentions cases that do in fact use a deferential
standard, those cases are not appropriate for use in evaluating the
PBABA.4 5 7

franchise"); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69 n.6 (1981) (stating that great deference
is given to Congress for matters pertaining to military needs).
451. Holsinger, supra note 329, at 611 (stating "the Voting Rights Act was an attempt by
Congress to enforce a constitutional right; by contrast, PBABA represents a congressional effort
to limit a constitutional right that has been articulated by the Supreme Court").
452. Id. at 611 (stating that "the congressional enactment considered by the Katzenbach Court
is easily distinguishable from PBABA"); see supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the PBABA's
Congressional Findings section and its reference to Katzenbach and the deferential standard of
review used in that case).
453. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. No. L. 108-105, § 2(11), 117 Stat. 1201,
1203 (noting that the "Court [in Turner] continued its practice of deferring to congressional
factual findings in reviewing the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992"); see supra Part Ifl.C.2
(discussing PBABA's Congressional Findings section and its reference to Turner and the
deferential standard of review used in that case).
454. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 626 (1994).
455. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 665-66 (noting that Congress is better equipped than the Court in
amassing and evaluating information concerning the legislation and that the role of the Court is to
determine whether Congress made "reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence," not to
review the information de novo).
456. See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 612; Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(7)-(8) (noting
that the Findings section in the PBABA was included to avoid the deference given in Stenberg
that led the Court to reject Nebraska's law). But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529
(1997) (explaining that Congress cannot alter the constitutionality of a law). See generally supra
Part III.C.2 (discussing the Congressional Findings section of the PBABA).
457. See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 610-13 (explaining why the congressional findings are
not accurate analyses of the deferential standards that should be used to evaluate the PBABA).
See generally supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Congressional Findings section of the PBABA).
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2. The Supreme Court Should Not Give Deference to the
Congressional Findings Included in the PBABA
Because the Findings Are an Attempt To Supercede
a Judicial Constitutional Holding
A more appropriate look at deferential standards and congressional
findings is in City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Supreme Court held
that Congress may not overrule a Constitutional provision using
legislative findings. 458 The Court explained that Congress' role is

limited to devising legislation in accordance with judicial interpretation,
not the other way around. 459 The Supreme Court relied on Flores in
deciding Dickerson v. United States.4 6 0 At issue in Dickerson was
whether Congress intended to overrule the Court's prior decision in
Miranda v. Arizona46 1 when it enacted a law on the admissibility of
confessions. 46 2 The Court held that because Miranda had announced a

458. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (describing the role of Congress as determining the
need for legislation, but not its constitutionality). See generally Holsinger, supra note 329, at 612
(explaining the use of City of Boerne in relation to the PBABA).
459. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (stating that Congress does not have the power to decree
the substance of the Constitution's restrictions on the states' authority). At issue in Flores was
whether Congress had the authority to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").
Id. at 511. Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Department
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Id. at 512. In Smith, Native Americans
brought a suit for unemployment benefits after they lost their jobs because they used peyote.
Smith, 494 U.S at 874. The Court held that denying benefits was appropriate here because their
action was "socially harmful." Id. at 885. The Court in Flores held that congressional
enforcement power is not unlimited and that enacting RFRA was outside the scope of
congressional authority. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519 (stating that Congress "has been given the
power to enforce, not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation" (internal
quotations omitted)). Ultimately, the Court noted that to maintain a proper separation of powers,
Congress must be confined to its constitutional authority. Id. at 536 ("Broad as the power of
Congress is ... RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and
the federal balance."); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM L. REV. 237, 304
(2002) (stating that the "Court rebuffed Congress's attempts and stated unequivocally its view
that it is supreme in its interpretation of the Constitution"); Leonard, supra note 447, at 117-18
("Congress had no power to define constitutional violations. Rather, Congress' role ... was
limited to devising legislation to enforce ... rights as the courts determined them.").
460. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (citing to Flores, stating that
"Congress may not legislatively supercede our decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution").
461. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination").
462. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (finding
18 U.S.C. § 3501 to be unconstitutional).
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Similarly, when evaluating the PBABA, the Supreme Court should
use the Boerne and Dickerson standard of judicial deference 4 64 because
the Court in Stenberg also announced a constitutional rule concerning
late term abortion procedures. 4 65 Additionally, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
the Court warned against creating legislation specifically intended to
circumvent the right to privacy ruling in Griswold.4 66 Another warning

is found in Griswold, in which Justice Goldberg commented that
46 7
deferential standards are not meant to infringe on fundamental rights.
Furthermore, the Stenberg majority concluded that banning "partial

birth abortion" was an undue burden on a woman's right to choose, in
violation of Casey.46 8 In Stenberg, the Court made it abundantly clear
that regulations on an abortion procedure could not infringe on the life
or health of the woman, and that a regulation could not ban the D & E
procedure because such a ban would be an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion. 46 9 Therefore, the Supreme Court

should not defer to the congressional findings included in the PBABA,
for the findings section of the PBABA cannot supercede the judicial

holding in Stenberg any more than congressional findings could in
470
Dickerson or Boerne.

463. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444; see also Barkow, supra note 459, at 308 (explaining that
Congress cannot overrule the Supreme Court on a constitutional issue).
464. See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 612-13 (discussing the applicability of the rationale of
City of Boerne and Dickerson).
465. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (stating that "a law designed to further the
State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal
viability is unconstitutional" (internal quotations omitted)). See generally supra Part II.B.3
(discussing the Stenberg decision).
466. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450 (1972) (stating that "the legislature.., merely
made what it thought to be the precise accommodation necessary to escape the Griswold ruling").
See generally supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the right to privacy cases including Griswold and
Eisenstadt).
467. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("I do not
believe that this [deferential standard] includes the power to experiment with the fundamental
liberties of citizens."). See generally supra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the Griswold opinion).
468. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
469. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (noting that the Nebraska law banning partial birth abortion is
unconstitutional for two reasons, first because the law lacks a health exception, and second
because the law imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion). See generally
supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
470. See Stephanie D. Schmutz, Infanticide or Civil Rights for Women: Did the Supreme
Court Go Too Farin Stenberg v. Carhart?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 529, 562-63 (2002) (stating that "if
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is signed into law, and then challenged, the Court will most
likely follow the principle articulated in Dickerson and find the Act unconstitutional"). See
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Justice O'Connor's Requirements Are Not Met Even Under a
Deferential Standard

A careful reading of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Stenberg will show that banning "partial birth" abortion may not require
a health exception. 47 1 However, the majority in Stenberg held that a
health exception was required under Casey.4 72 Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to state that a health exception would be necessary only if
there was no safe alternative; prohibiting D & X is not, in and of itself,
an "undue burden" she concluded.4 7 3 Because the ruling in Stenberg

was by a narrow five-to-four margin, Justice O'Connor's unique
concurrence may be crucial when the PBABA reaches the Supreme
Justice O'Connor has been described as a "hero" for
Court. 474
maintaining a consistent opinion predicated on free choice in lifeof the PBABA, Justice O'Connor
defining matters.4 75 In an evaluation
4 76
status.
heroine
her
retain
will
likely

Justice O'Connor advanced two requirements for a constitutional
abortion procedure ban: first, the law must not be vague as to the
procedure it bans, and second, where there do not seem to be adequate
alternatives, the law must contain a health exception. 477 The PBABA

generally supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion that held a Nebraska law banning
partial birth abortion unconstitutional based on the fact-finding of the trial court).
471. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]f there were
adequate alternative methods for a woman safely to obtain an abortion before viability, it is
unlikely that prohibiting the D & X procedure alone would" violate Casey). See generally supra
Part II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
472. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (citing Casey for the two reasons the Nebraska law was
unconstitutional: the law did not distinguish between the D & X and D & E, and the law did not
provide an exception for the health of the woman seeking the abortion).
473. Id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1115 ("It is
revealing that Justice O'Connor's pointed statements did not make it into the majority opinion.").
See generally supra Part lI.B.4 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Stenberg
and her willingness to reconsider her position on future abortion cases if her requirements are
met).
474. See Davis & Gilligan, supra note 158, at 904-14 (explaining Justice O'Connor's voting
record with respect to Due Process cases and commenting that it is possible that Justice O'Connor
will rule against abortion rights in some contexts). See generallysupra Part 11.B.3 (discussing the
Stenberg opinion).
475. Davis & Gilligan, supra note 158, at 895 (stating that Justice O'Connor is a hero for her
"constitutional scheme ... of uncoerced decision making about such life-defining matters as
marriage, procreation, parenting, and the manner of one's death").
476. See infra notes 478-84 and accompanying text (explaining why Justice O'Connor will
not likely vote in favor of upholding the PBABA).
477. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "a ban on partial birth
abortion that only proscribed the D & X method of abortion and that included an exception to
preserve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional"). See generally supra Part
II.B.3 (discussing the Stenberg opinion).
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meets neither of these requirements. 47 8 As explained above, the law
does not explicitly ban only the D & X procedure. 4 79 Congress could
480
have drafted the law in another way to do just that, but it did not.
Moreover, the PBABA explicitly denies women a health exception,
despite the fact that Justice O'Connor explicitly mentioned a
requirement for the "life and health" of the woman seeking an
abortion. 4 8 1 The Congressional Findings section of the PBABA asserts
that a health exception is not necessary. 4 82 However, Justice O'Connor

argued that for her to consider an abortion ban constitutional, such an3
48

exception would be necessary where alternatives are not adequate.
For these two reasons, when the Supreme Court reviews the PBABA,
Justice O'Connor is not likely to change her opinion on the validity of a
ban on the D & X abortion procedure, even if the Supreme Court
applies the deferential standard advocated by the congressional
484
findings.
V.

PROPOSAL

Legislators must not undermine a woman's right to choose abortion
because they believe that they know more than doctors medically and
more than Supreme Court justices legally. 485 D & X is a medical
48 6
procedure that some women in certain circumstances need.
478. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206-07 (providing no health exception); supra Part IV.A (discussing the PBABA's applicability
to pre-viability procedures).
479. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the PBABA's applicability to pre-viability procedures).
480. See Holsinger, supra note 329, at 609 (describing how easy it would have been for
Congress to state that the PBABA prohibited only D & X).
481. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act §3(a); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Glidewell supra note 191, at 1144 (stating that "[n]ot including an
exception for when a woman's mental, emotional, or other kind of health is at risk is decidedly
contrary to the goal of preserving women's health").
482. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(5) (stating in the findings section that "a partial-birth
abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman"). See generally supra Part lII.C.2
(discussing the findings section included in the PBABA).
483. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally supra Part IV.B.I
(explaining why alternatives to D & X are not safer procedures); supra Part II.B.4 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Stenberg and her willingness to find an abortion ban
constitutional premised on health considerations).
484. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating two requirements for a
constitutional ban on D & X).
485. See supra Part IV.B.2 (explaining that legislators must not create medical legislation in
legal terminology and that doctors and legislators should work together to create any ban on
medical procedures).
486. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (telling the story of two women whose
doctors found that they needed the procedure Congress banned in the PBABA); see also ACOG
Brief, supra note 203, at 19 ("The unbroken tie that binds this Court's abortion cases is the
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Furthermore, any ban on the D & X procedure must include an
4 87
exception for the life and health of the woman seeking the abortion.
Congress should have written a law that both emphasized the role of
doctors in performing abortion and provided doctors with information
that is useful medically; a law must provide an exception for the health

of the woman seeking abortion, as determined in conjunction with her
88
4

doctor.
To date, the only legally effective way to ban a late term abortion
procedure is to define it medically and include the medical details of
how doctors perform the procedure. 4 89 Therefore, for the PBABA to be
constitutional, Congress should have specified that the law only renders
the post-viability D & X procedure illegal. 490 Further, Congress must

preeminence accorded to women's health, which derives from the inescapable fact that pregnancy
is fraught with health risks-including a risk of death. . that the woman alone must bear.");
Walther, supra note 185, at 735 ("The procedure should be an available alternative for doctors to
rely on if and when the patient's needs indicate that D & X would be beneficial.").
487. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (reiterating Roe's requirement
that any regulation on abortion have an exception for the life and health of the woman).
488. Cf Partial Birth Feticide, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(B)-(C) (West Supp. 2004)
(providing an example of a constitutional ban on an abortion procedure).
489. E.g., id. § 2919.151 (explaining the medical procedure known in Ohio as "partial-birth
feticide" by listing medical elements that must be performed in sequence to constitute a violation
of the law). The Ohio statute specifically notes that D & C and D & E are not prohibited. Id.
Furthermore, the statute excepts any procedure necessary for the purpose of maintaining the life
or health of the woman pre- or post viability. Id. See generally supra Part IV.A (arguing that the
PBABA is vague and could be applied to many procedures).
490. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 441 (2003) (comparing the
constitutional Ohio law with the unconstitutional provisions from the statute in Stenberg). The
Ohio statute contains a provision for the "life or health" of the woman seeking an abortion both
pre- and post viability. OHtO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 1(B)-(C). Furthermore, the Ohio law
states explicitly what it does and does not prohibit in a step-by-step explanation, naming the
medical procedures. Women's Med. ProfI Corp., 353 F.3d at 452-53. The Ohio Code provides:
(A) As used in this section:
(1) "Dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion" does not include the
dilation and extraction procedure of abortion.
(2) "From the body of the mother" means that the portion of the fetus' body
in question is beyond the mother's vaginal introitus in a vaginal delivery.
(3) "Partial birth procedure" means the medical procedure that includes all of
the following elements in sequence:
(a) Intentional dilation of the cervix of a pregnant woman, usually over a
sequence of days;
(b) In a breech presentation, intentional extraction of at least the lower
torso to the navel, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of
the mother, or in a cephalic presentation, intentional extraction of at least the
complete head, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of
the mother;
(c) Intentional partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of the fetus,
which procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the
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use medical terms to describe the procedure in a step-by-step analysis
making clear to doctors exactly what procedure is prohibited.4 9 '
Moreover, any ban on an abortion procedure should contain a health
exception with both subjective and objective components. 49 2 The

statute must take into account the varied amount of medical materials
and supplies among medical facilities and the varying expertise among

death of the fetus, intentional compression of the head of the fetus, which
procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death
of the fetus, or performance of another intentional act that the person
performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus;
(d) Completion of the vaginal delivery of the fetus.
(4) "Partially born" means that the portion of the body of an intact fetus
described in division (A)(3)(b) of this section has been intentionally extracted
from the body of the mother.
(5) "Serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function" means any medically diagnosed condition that so complicates
the pregnancy of the woman as to directly or indirectly cause the substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.
(6) "Viable" has the same meaning as in section 2901.01 of the Revised
Code.
(B) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is viable, no person shall
knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure
is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the
mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of
the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.
(C) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is not viable, no person shall
knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure
is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the
mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of
the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.
(D) Whoever violates division (B) or (C) of this section is guilty of partial birth
feticide, a felony of the second degree.
(E) A pregnant woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in
violation of division (B) or (C) of this section is not guilty of committing, attempting to
commit, complicity in the commission of, or conspiracy in the commission of a
violation of those divisions.
(F) This section does not prohibit the suction curettage procedure of abortion, the
suction aspiration procedure of abortion, or the dilation and evacuation procedure of
abortion.
(G) This section does not apply to any person who performs or attempts to perform
a legal abortion if the act that causes the death of the fetus is performed prior to the
fetus being partially born even though the death of the fetus occurs after it is partially
born.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151.
491. See supra note 490 (detailing the elements of a constitutional ban on an abortion
procedure).
492. See Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1147 (arguing that an ideal health exception provision
will account for both objective and subjective standards); see also supra Part IV.B (arguing that a
ban on an abortion procedure must have a health exception).
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doctors. 49 3 However, the law must also allow for doctors to exercise
their own good faith medical determinations. 494 A doctor's medical
4 95
judgment can include mental health as well as physical well-being.
Thus, a prohibition on a medical procedure should leave room for the
4 96
doctor to provide for the patient's health and best interest.
Prohibitions against abortion procedures must ensure that doctors are
not afraid to perform abortions because of vague congressional
instructions. 4 97 If doctors are afraid to treat their patients properly, then
there will be an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose pre498
viability abortion.

Accordingly, if Congress insists on passing a post-viability partial
birth abortion ban, Congress must outline explicitly the exact procedure

it prohibits in a step-by-step framework. 499 Further, Congress must
provide an exception for the life and health of the woman seeking the
abortion, including a mental health exception and an exception for
victims of rape and incest.50 0 Thus, an exception for only physical
well-being is insufficient. 50 1 A woman's destiny should not be in the

493. Id.; cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (noting the intraprofessional remedies for
doctors who abuse medical privileges); Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1148 ("If physicians are not
accountable to any outside authority, the medical world will be as dangerous and impractical as a
world where doctors are required to get approval for every move they make.").
494. See Glidewell, supra note 191, at 1147; see also supra Part IV.B (arguing that a ban on
an abortion procedure must have a health exception).
495. See supra Part III.B.3 (examining the mental health exception requirement); see also
supra Part IV.B (arguing that a ban on an abortion procedure must have a health exception).
496. Walther, supra note 185, at 735 (commenting that the validity of a ban on an abortion
procedure "should relieve the physician from liability for performing a post-viability D & X
abortion when necessary to protect the life or health of the [woman]").
497. See Massie, supra note 243, at 334 (explaining the chilling effect on the number of
abortion procedures performed that will result from doctors' fear of prosecution under a vague
law).
498. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (noting that if the statute at issue
applied to D & E, as the Court held it did, it would be an undue burden on a woman's ability to
choose pre-viability abortion).
499. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (West Supp. 2004) (providing an example of a
constitutional ban on an abortion procedure); see also Walther, supra note 185, at 734 (explaining
that pre-viability, a ban on D & X should be found unconstitutional because D & X "has
demonstrable benefits to women's health"); supra Part IV.A (arguing that the PBABA is vague
and does not state explicitly what is prohibited).
500. See supra Part III.B.3 (examining the health exception requirements); supra Part IV.B
(explaining that a constitutional ban on an abortion procedure must contain an adequate exception
for the health of the woman).
501. See Walther, supra note 185, at 734 (stating that the "health exception should be broad
enough to allow the doctor to evaluate mental health concerns in addition to physical health");
supra Part IV.B (explaining that a constitutional ban on an abortion procedure must contain an
adequate exception for the health of the woman).
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hands of legislators but rather in the hands of her physician and her
family.
VI. CONCLUSION

A woman's right to choose to have an abortion arises from the
fundamental right to privacy. It cannot be taken away because a group
of legislators on Capitol Hill believe that an abortion method is
gruesome. Roe and Casey created a specific framework through which
the government can achieve its legislative goal of reducing the number
of abortions. But to do so at the expense of women's health is
outrageous. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 does not
satisfy the general requirements set forth by the Court in Stenberg or by
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence. A proper ban on a medical
procedure must include exceptions to allow doctors the latitude to use
their medical expertise. Congress has never before banned a safe
medical procedure, and Congress should not have done so now;
therefore, the Supreme Court is likely to declare the PBABA
unconstitutional.

